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Although potentially offering the benefits of crime control and
sentence reduction, some Blacks are convinced that cooperation with
criminal investigations and prosecutions should be avoided. One factor
contributing to this perspective is America’s reliance on Black informants
to police and socially control Blacks during slavery, the Civil Rights
Movement, and the Wars on Drugs, Crime, and Gangs. Notwithstanding
this historical justification for non-cooperation, only a few informant law
and policy scholars have examined closely the Black community’s
relationship with informing. Furthermore, even among this small group,
noticeably absent are historical explorations of Black America’s
experience with informing during slavery. Drawn using a variety of
primary and secondary historical and legal sources, this Article sketches
the socio-legal creation, use, and regulation of Black informants in the
Black community during slavery, as well as Black society’s response at
that time. In developing a snapshot of the past, the Article reveals many
similarities between the Black experience with informing while enslaved
and in contemporary times. Consideration of these resemblances during
present debate on the topic of cooperation may help to facilitate nuanced
conversation as to whether and how modern Black citizens and the
government should approach using informants in current times.
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“Young generations of African-Americans, unmindful of their legacy of
resistance against the slavery system, don’t understand that snitching is
not cool.”
1
—Mumia Abu-Jamal
I. INTRODUCTION
The government relies upon a large, unregulated collection of
2
snitches to ensure the operation of the modern criminal justice system.
Government officials claim snitches are necessary for efficient and
3
Nevertheless, legal scholarship has
effective crime-fighting.
4
documented a host of mischiefs bred by dependence on snitches. It is
especially troubling that these harms disproportionately fall upon the
Black community, specifically those individuals who dwell in urban,
5
impoverished, high-crime neighborhoods.
6
A
Black viewpoints on snitching and informing are varied.
particularly controversial mindset is reflected in the “Stop Snitching”

03/17/2014 11:30:34
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1. Mumia Abu-Jamal, The Snitch Factor, REFUSE & RESIST! (Jan. 14, 1999),
http://www.refuseandresist.org/big_brother/020699maj398.html.
2. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE
EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 1–3 (2009) [hereinafter NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL
INFORMANTS]; Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal
Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 645 (2004) [hereinafter Natapoff, Communal
Consequences].
3. See MALACHI L. HARNEY & JOHN C. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 12, 14 (2d ed. 1968) (discussing former law enforcement officers’ recognition
of the necessity of informants); Rick Hampson, Anti-snitch Campaign Riles Police,
Prosecutors, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2006, at A1 (quoting Pittsburgh police commander:
“Informers are a necessary evil”).
4. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 36–38; Natapoff,
Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 646.
5. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 35, 118.
6. In this Article, I use “snitching” or “snitch” to exemplify individuals who expect or
actually receive a government-conferred benefit in exchange for providing officials with
incriminating information. I use the broader terms “inform” or “informant” or “informing”
for those who provide information regardless of benefit, thus including snitches as well as
bystander and victim-witnesses. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
an informant as: “One who informs against another; esp., one who confidentially supplies
information to the police about a crime, sometimes in exchange for a reward or special
treatment”). I believe the broader concept is appropriately considered alongside the
narrower term because limiting discussion to snitches may obscure the complexities of the
issue: some Blacks discourage any type of informing and all types of informants may be
troublesome to the criminal justice system.
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ethic revealed by the 2004 publication of an underground video
7
recording filmed in a Baltimore City neighborhood. Today, Stop
8
Snitching is often associated generally with urban or hip-hop culture.
The contours of the credo are debatable. At a minimum, Stop Snitching
dictates that those engaging in criminal behavior not incriminate others
9
engaging in crime. In its strongest form, the expression prescribes that
community residents—law-abiding or otherwise—refuse to provide
information to government authorities for criminal investigations and
10
prosecutions.
Widespread awareness of the Stop Snitching idiom has provided a
platform for robust debate—publicly and within the Black community—

03/17/2014 11:30:34
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Among scholars and the general public, there is no uniform agreement on the meaning
or use of these terms. See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF
JUSTICE 81–82 (2009) (distinguishing between snitches and witnesses); HARNEY & CROSS,
supra note 3, at 31 (“All people who are sources of information, generically, and in the broad
sense of the term, could be referred to as informers.”); BAKARI KITWANA, THE HIP HOP
GENERATION 68 (2002) (“[I]nformants (also known as snitches) who agree to plead guilty
and testify as government witnesses in exchange for special considerations, including
leniency . . . .”); Natapoff, Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 645 n.1, 652 (limiting her
work to criminal informants who receive a government-conferred benefit in exchange for
providing information); Marc Lamont Hill, Damned If You Do. Damned if You Don’t,
BARBERSHOP NOTEBOOKS, http://www.popmatters.com/pm/column/hill060224-1/ (last
visited Jan. 2, 2014).
7. See Jeremy Kahn, The Story of a Snitch, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 2007, at 80, 86,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/04/the-story-of-a-snitch/305703
(describing the Stop Fucking Snitchin’ video and ethic, and spread of the motto); see also
Subsequently, the federal
STOP FUCKIN SNITCHIN’ (Skinny Surge Records 2004).
government prosecuted a primary participant in the film on racketeering charges. See Press
Release, U.S. Atty’s Office, E. Shore TTP Leader & Balt. TTP Bloods Member Who
Produced “Stop Snitching” Videos Sentenced to Lengthy Prison Terms for Racketeering
Activities (June 25, 2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/baltimore/press-releases/2010/ba
062510.htm (describing the prosecution of video producer).
8. See Touré, A Snitch Like Me, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at 3 (“I come from the hiphop generation, in which snitching against a black person is treason.”).
9. See Tom Farrey, ‘Snitching’ Controversy Goes Well Beyond ‘Melo, ESPN MAGAZINE
(Jan. 18, 2006), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=farrey_tom&id=2296
590 (quoting the producer of the Stop Snitching video: “The people in this documentary are
referring to fellow criminals who snitch. And they’re saying, stop doing that. You did the
crime, you do the time.”).
10. See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE
STOP SNITCHING PHENOMENON: BREAKING THE CODE OF SILENCE 10 (2009) (describing a
“campaign urging people to ‘stop snitching’ when they are witnesses to, or victims of, crime”);
Kahn, supra note 7 at 88; 60 Minutes: Stop Snitchin’, (CBS television broadcast Apr. 22, 2007),
transcript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/04/19/60minutes/main2704565.sht
ml (“‘Stop snitchin’ once meant ‘don’t tell on others if you’re caught committing a
crime.’ . . . [I]t has come to mean something much more dangerous: ‘don’t cooperate with the
police—no matter who you are.’”).
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on snitching and informing. Citizens from widely varying walks of life
have weighed in on Stop Snitching. Local community residents directly
affected by informing and government officials charged with policing
11
those communities have made known their perspectives.
It has
12
attracted the attention of legal scholars. Within the Black community,
entertainers, journalists, public intellectuals, and academics have also
contributed their viewpoints either for or against snitching and, more
13
broadly, informing.
Some proponents and opponents of informing make arguments
reflecting modern-day practical concerns. Advocates for informing
argue that it is necessary to prevent and solve crime, particularly drug
crime and Black-on-Black crime, and that choosing to inform is
understandable in light of the extreme criminal penalties faced by one
14
who does not inform. In response, their adversaries point to the litany
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Rap is bridging jail mentality straight into the middle schools via radio and video
overdosing. There’s a big anti-snitching thing moving in the hoods of America, but
dig this—the term ‘snitch’ was best applied to those that ratted revolutionaries like
Huey P Newton, Bobby Seale, Che Guevera to the fascist governments during the
60’s and 70s. Let’s not let stupid cats use hip hop to again twist this meaning for the
sake of some ‘innerganghood’ violent drug thug crime dogs, who’ve sacrificed the
black community’s women and children. Not the same . . . and rap needs to speak
and protect the people sometimes and not contribute to genocidal systems.
Chuck D, Chuck D’s Christmas List: What I Should Want in HIP HOP 2006, HIP HOP
SPORTS NETWORK (Dec. 14, 2005, 12:24 PM), http://hiphopsports.typepad.com/hhsn/2005/12/
chuck_ds_christ.html.
14. See BUTLER, supra note 6, at 79–100 (summarizing the debate surrounding
informing); JUAN WILLIAMS, ENOUGH: THE PHONY LEADERS, DEAD END MOVEMENTS,
AND CULTURE OF FAILURE THAT ARE UNDERMINING BLACK AMERICA—AND WHAT WE
CAN DO ABOUT IT 111–18 (2006) (decrying the growth of the Stop Snitching movement for
its increase in Black crime).
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11. See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 10, at 14; Ronald
Moten, The Real Meaning of ‘Snitching,’ WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2007, at B2.
12. See Michael L. Rich, Lessons of Disloyalty in the World of Criminal Informants, 49
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1493, 1513–18 (2012). See generally Bret D. Asbury, Anti-Snitching
Norms and Community Loyalty, 89 OR. L. REV. 1257 (2011).
13. See BUTLER, supra note 6, at 85–87, 95–96, 98–100 (describing contested views
within the hip-hop community and regular citizens from the perspective of a Black law
professor, and advocating for noncooperation in some instances); Tony Norman, A Snitch in
Time Sometimes Saves Me and Mine, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 16, 2006, at A2
(describing a black journalist’s account of personal and communal debates over snitching in
the context of raising three Black sons); Touré, supra note 8 (describing a Black journalist’s
personal, internal debate over calling police about a crack house in his Brooklyn
neighborhood); Hill, supra note 6 (describing the complexity underlying the Stop Snitching
mantra from the perspective of a Black education professor). Iconic rapper Chuck D publicly
stated:
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of bad outcomes for already marginalized Black communities, including:
unnecessary and disproportionate incarceration of Black men; increased
crime; government abuses such as police brutality; unreliable
convictions; individual and communal intimidation and retaliation that
the government is unwilling or unable to prevent; and a fractionated and
15
suspicious Black community.
America’s history of criminal justice enforcement of and within the
Black community—both recent and centuries old—provides another
rationale for some Black Americans who oppose informing. During the
American Civil Rights Movement, the United States government
seeded Black communities with confidential informants instructed to
monitor and report on the activities of movement participants—both
16
famous and ordinary—as well as to act as agents provocateur.
Following on the heels of the Civil Rights Movement are the now
17
decades-old Wars on Drugs, Crime, and Gangs. During these “wars,”
state and federal governments have relied heavily on criminal suspects,
jailhouse informants, and street-based confidential informants to police
18
communities, particularly Black ones.
Reversing course in time, the Black American experience during
19
slavery also offers a rationale against informing.
Quite pointedly,

03/17/2014 11:30:34
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15. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 69, 104–06, 108–09, 116–
18, 129–34; OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 10, at 3, 20–21 (citing
a community activist’s opinion that an unfair criminal justice system discourages cooperation,
this report was funded by the U.S. Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing
Services); Natapoff, Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 646, 688, 690–92.
16. See KENNETH O’REILLY, “RACIAL MATTERS”: THE FBI’S SECRET FILE ON BLACK
AMERICA, 1960–1972, at 261, 267 (1989).
17. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 128 (“Inner-city America
has been living with drug informants for the duration of the war on drugs—over twenty
years.”); Andrea L. Dennis, Collateral Damage? Juvenile Snitches in America’s “Wars” on
Drugs, Crime, and Gangs, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2009) (“Within the criminal
justice system, a vibrant snitching institution operates to assist the government in its ‘wars’ on
drugs, crime, and gangs.”).
18. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 128; Natapoff, Communal
Consequences, supra note 2, at 692.
19. BUTLER, supra note 6, at 99 (citing the use of an informant to uncover Denmark
Vesey’s slave rebellion plot); Moten, supra note 11; Abu-Jamal, supra note 1 (citing examples
of slave rebellions and revolts that failed because of snitches); Regina N. Bradley, G.I.I.F.T.
(Get It In Friday Thoughts) Vol. I, RED CLAY SCHOLAR (Feb. 26, 2010),
http://redclayscholar.blogspot.com/2010/02/giift-get-it-in-friday-thoughts-vol-i.html
(citing
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN
AMERICAN SLAVE (1845), reprinted in EARLY AFRICAN-AMERICAN CLASSICS 13, 97
(Anthony Appiah ed., 1990)) (discussing Frederick Douglass’ unwillingness to reveal how he
escaped slavery).
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Mumia Abu-Jamal, journalist and former Pennsylvania death row
inmate, who is quoted to open this article, wrote:
Throughout the long, tortured centuries of oppression against
Blacks in America, a special contempt was reserved for those
who dared snitch against the endangered slave community,
people who made their “livings” by selling out their own people,
sending information to dreaded slave-catchers in the South, who
used the infamous Fugitive Slave Act to track and re-enslave
20
those who dared escape their fiendish clutches.

C M
Y K
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20. Abu-Jamal, supra note 1.
21. See BUTLER, supra note 6, at 99; Norman, supra note 13 (mentioning the impact of
slavery); see also 60 Minutes: Stop Snitchin’, supra note 10 (discussing the “Stop Snitchin’”
motto and Blacks’ reluctance to talk to police); Abu-Jamal, supra note 1 (citing government
activities during the Civil Rights Movement).
22. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 107–13 (1997). History
professor Kenneth O’Reilly documented in painstaking detail the FBI’s program of
informants in the Black community. O’REILLY, supra note 16, at 107, 224, 265–70, 274, 292,
301, 306, 309, 334, 337, 346, 356.
23. See Natapoff, Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 692.
24. Generally speaking, scholars detailing the historical use of informants point to their
use in ancient Greek and Roman society, Biblical times, the Middle Ages, and
Enlightenment. See, e.g., ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF

34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 40 Side A

Thus, since its earliest days, the United States’ approach to policing
Blacks’ alleged criminality was often predicated on using Black citizens
to target other Black citizens, sometimes fairly and sometimes
shockingly unfairly. And these Black experiences of criminal justice
policy are claimed to have bred deep distrust of government and
21
informing.
Legal scholars of informant law and policy tend to only modestly
discuss historical aspects of the practice, and noticeably absent from
even these brief discussions is Black America’s historical experience
with informing. Two exceptions exist. Professor Randall Kennedy—in
support of a larger work on race and criminal justice—wrote briefly
regarding the FBI’s destructive use of informants in the Black
22
community during the Civil Rights Movement. Professor Alexandra
Natapoff richly explored the harms of snitching during the War on
23
Drugs, particularly for the Black community.
Notwithstanding the
writings of Kennedy and Natapoff, at best, most informant law scholars
have cursorily referenced the FBI’s use of informants to investigate
Black leaders and organizations during the Civil Rights era, which
24
coincided with the Vietnam War era.
Thus, Black snitching and
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informing during slavery remain completely unexamined. This omission
is striking in light of the centrality of slavery to the Black American and
United States experience, historical justifications offered for Blacks’
unwillingness to inform, and the disproportionate impact of modern
informing policies and practices on Black communities.
This Article fills a gap in knowledge by sketching the socio-legal
creation, use, and regulation of informants in the Black community
25
during slavery and the Black community’s response at that time. This
Article proceeds in six parts, using primary and secondary historical and
legal sources from a variety of locales. The various primary sources
referenced include slave codes, legislative and judicial petitions, case
law, and narratives. The petitions and narratives are the products of
enslaved as well as free Blacks, and Whites. These first person accounts
are often profound and moving, thus at times these sources are heavily
quoted. Secondary sources include academic works by historians—legal
and non-legal—of slavery.
Part II describes Whites’ need for and cultivation of Black
informants who were vital to the White community’s prevention,

03/17/2014 11:30:34
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INFORMANTS IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 1–6 (2002) (providing an overview of
informing in a variety of historical contexts). Not surprisingly, given the historical connection
between the English and American legal systems, scholars describe the development of a
government-backed system of informants in England and translation to policing in the
American colonies. See, e.g., id. at 6; Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in
Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1992) (surveying the history of agreements between
informants and prosecutors in exchange for cooperation in criminal cases). Moving forward
in the U.S. history timeline, the American government’s formal use of informants has been
linked historically with post-WWI Bolshevism (the Red Scare), McCarthyism (the Second
Red Scare), the Vietnam War era, and Mafia RICO prosecutions. See, e.g., BLOOM, supra, at
7, 81–92; Ellen Schrecker, McCarthyism: Political Repression and the Fear of Communism, 71
SOC. RES. 1041, 1049, 1058, 1064 (2004). Finally, the present-day snitching institution in
relation to the War on Drugs and War on Terror has received treatment. See generally
Natapoff, Communal Consequences, supra note 2; Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85
WASH. L. REV. 687, 715–38 (2010).
25. The institutionalization of Black slavery gradually occurred over time through social
and legal means. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: THE
COLONIAL PERIOD 20–22 (1978). In 1619, the first Africans arrived in Jamestown, Virginia—
likely as indentured servants. Id. at 20. By 1660, statutory law in the colony of Virginia began
to recognize life-long servitude by Blacks. Id. at 34 (citing Act of English Running Away with
Negroes, Act XXII (1660), in 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR
1619, at 26 (William Waller Hening ed., N.Y.C., R. & W. & G. Bartow 1823)). By 1705,
Virginia had formally and fully excluded Blacks from legal and social society.
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra at 58. The other colonies followed Virginia’s lead. Id. at 60. Slavery
continued in the colonies and then the states until the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified on
December 6, 1865. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.E.
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detection, investigation, and prosecution of Black misconduct affecting
White communal or personal interests. Informants were used to police
a wide assortment of offending behavior and were deemed especially
26
helpful at preventing and squelching rebellions.
Part II also
distinguishes among informants. Some cooperators merely provided
information while others actively assisted Whites in regulating Black
27
misconduct.
Blacks confronted with making a choice as to whether to inform
likely weighed multiple factors.
Part III lists and exemplifies
commonplace factors. Weighing in on the side of informing were loyalty
to owner, preservation of one’s life or status, communal self-regulation,
28
attainment of liberty or criminal leniency, and financial reward.
Communal solidarity, resistance ethic, and fear of retaliation, as well as
29
protection of others countenanced not informing. Religious conviction
was a swing factor depending on the particular individual or
30
circumstance.
Debates on informing commonly implicate questions of loyalty. In
so keeping, Parts IV through VI more closely examine three loyaltyrelated themes exposed in Parts II and III: (1) the creditable existence
of what may be termed a “code of silence” held by Blacks during
slavery; (2) the revelation of slave rebellions and runaways as the
ultimate betrayal by one Black person of another Black person; and (3)
the claimed willingness of domestic slaves to freely inform to their
owners out of misplaced loyalty. Part IV argues that some Blacks
rejected the legal and socially based opportunities and motivations to
inform. Such individual or communal response offered a means to resist
White oppression and build group loyalty. Notwithstanding this
possible code of silence, some Blacks did inform on other Blacks, and
Part V offers descriptions of arguably the utmost form of betrayal—the
disclosure of information regarding a slave rebellion or the location of a
runaway slave.
Part VI briefly defends domestic, or house, slaves who hold an
especially negative place in the mind of the modern Black community.
This Part speaks to the allegation that domestic slaves frequently and
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31. See infra Part VII.
32. See infra Part VII.
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unabashedly betrayed their fellow enslaved, sometimes for little benefit.
Part VI concludes that while undoubtedly some house slaves did inform,
it is unfair to malign the entire class of domestic slaves.
Finally, in light of the reality that some Blacks did inform, Part VII
describes the impact of informing on the Black community. Not
surprisingly, informant betrayals bred distrust and disunity, both of
which are posited as modern-day consequences of informing in the
31
Black community.
Black informants arguably also engendered
inaction among slaves who might have been reluctant to engage in
32
rebellious misconduct for fear of being exposed to Whites.
The Article concludes by mentioning future avenues of historical
inquiry on Black informing during slavery and ruminating on the
implications of the current state of knowledge on contemporary
informant law and policy. This Article does not, however, offer any
normative or prescriptive conclusions. Thus, no opinion is offered as to
whether Blacks should continue or give up reliance on slavery, and
history more generally, to support an anti-cooperative ethic. Similarly,
whether government officials should cease employing informants to
police Blacks because of the painful experiences of Blacks with
informing throughout American history remains unresolved. Until such
time as the historical picture of the Black experience with informing is
flush, answers to those matters are speculative.
The way in which Black people experienced informing during
slavery is surely but one factor among a multitude of factors influencing
modern Black Americans’ perspectives on informing. Ideally, the
historical information herein will be expanded upon and then coupled
with information—extant or to be discovered—regarding the Black
experience with informing during other historical eras such as
Reconstruction, Jim Crow, the Civil Rights Movement, and the War on
Drugs. Black America’s experience during these times also likely has
both independent and cumulative force in establishing modern attitudes
on informing. Once complete, this collective information should
facilitate nuanced conversation as to whether historically grounded
justifications for anti-cooperation today are sensible; whether the Black
community should be demonized for holding any anti-cooperative ethic;
whether Blacks—individually and communally—should or can endorse
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informing; and how current policy should respond in light of the Black
33
community’s viewpoints.
Unquestionably, obvious and significant differences between the
Black community’s position in today’s society and during slave times
serve to undermine reference to slavery as a rationalization for not
informing. Most apparently, Blacks today are not slaves and so they are
not focused on the most basic recognition of their individual and
collective humanity. Relatedly, informing on fellow slave subjects poses
greater moral dilemmas than informing on a neighborhood drug
34
dealer.
Also, even if marginalized, Blacks currently receive
significantly more social and legal protections than during slavery.
Finally, during slavery, the prime beneficiary of law and legal policy—
including that related to informants—was White society, while Black
informants currently are credited with benefiting Black communities,
particularly those besieged by crime. This non-exhaustive list only
touches the surface; certainly, more distinctions may be offered.

II. THE DEMAND FOR BLACK INFORMANTS
Slave owners, and Whites more widely, needed Black informants to
protect personal and communal interests as well as to preserve the
institution of slavery. Information about the misdeeds of Blacks was
helpful to Whites, but Whites also benefited from the active efforts of
Blacks to police other Blacks. Governments promoted informing by
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33. See Alfred L. Brophy, Introducing Applied Legal History, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 233,
233 (2013) (describing applied legal history as “deeply researched, serious scholarship that is
motivated by, engages with, or speaks to contemporary issues”).
34. See Norman, supra note 13; Bradley, supra note 19.
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In light of these dissimilarities, concluding that no comparison can or
should be made between experiences and positions today and in the past
is tenable. On the other hand, drawing a line from past to present by
recovering the experiences of slave and free Blacks with informing
offers a sounder position from which to understand the modern Black
community’s ambivalence regarding informing. Thus, even without
drawing normative conclusions or offering prescriptive solutions, this
Article importantly advances our understanding as to why
contemporary Blacks may distrust informants and government
promotion of informing, which in turn, at a minimum, may undergird
our response.
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Blacks.
State codes expressly authorized legislatures to reward
35
“informers” who acted as private prosecutors.
It is highly likely,
though, that Blacks were not eligible for these “informer” rewards, only
36
Whites. Instead, legislatures enacted distinct code provisions allowing
37
slaves in limited circumstances to be compensated for informing.
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35. See Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) (“Statutes providing for actions by a
common informer, who himself had no interest whatever in the controversy other than that
given by statute, have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this country
ever since the foundation of our Government.”); Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New
Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and Suggestions for Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 81, 157–67 (1994) (describing the history of informers in England and the United States).
36. Statutory language was not clear as to whether slaves and free Blacks could be
“informers” (i.e., private prosecutors). See Zimmerman, supra note 35, at 157–66. Where
White misconduct was at issue, courts would have been highly unlikely to interpret statutes to
allow slaves to collect these rewards. See LOUISIANA BLACK CODE § 16 (June 7, 1806), in 2
STATUTES ON SLAVERY: SLAVERY, RACE, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1700–1872,
at 47, 50 (Paul Finkleman ed., 1988) [hereinafter 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY]. Slaves could
not legally own property. LOUISIANA BLACK CODE § 15 (June 7, 1806), in 2 STATUTES ON
SLAVERY, supra at 50. Slaves could not offer evidence or testimony against Whites, only
against Blacks. LOUISIANA BLACK CODE § 16 (June 7, 1806), in 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY,
supra at 50. Possibly, free Blacks or other non-Whites could be “informers” in order to
maintain the distinction between slaves and all others; yet, case law suggests that such a
conclusion is not forgone. In a civil case, a White property owner argued that Blacks could
not be “informers.” Ruth v. Maryland, 20 Md. 436, 438 (1864). A free Black property owner
filed suit concerning the destruction by a neighboring White owner of a tree alleged to be on
the plaintiff’s property. Id. at 436. Though an “informer” is competent to be a witness, the
defendant argued that a negro, “free or slave,” could not be an “informer” because he was
incompetent to testify (presumably against a White person). Id. at 438. The defendant
further argued that a slave could not be an “informer” because he could not own a boundary
and cannot initiate a qui tam action. Id. at 439. Though the issue was not resolved by the
court, the case provides some sense of the tenor of the argument as to whether a slave or free
Black could be an “informer.” See generally id. at 438–42.
37. See, e.g., HERBERT APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS 143 (5th ed.
1983) (citing An Act for Ordering and Governing Slaves within This Province, and for
Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of Offences Committed by Such Slaves, and Other
Persons Therein Mentioned, and to Prevent the Inveighling, and Carrying Away Slaves from
Their Masters, Owners, or Employers, §§ 13–14 (1770), in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF GEORGIA, FROM ITS SETTLEMENT AS A BRITISH PROVINCE, IN 1775, TO THE
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN 1880, INCLUSIVE, 426, 430–31 (Horatio Marbury &
William H. Crawford, eds., Savannah, Seymour, Woolhopter & Stebbins 1802) [hereinafter
DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA]). During slavery, legislatures enacted
statutes called Slave Codes (or occasionally Black Codes) designed to legally effectuate the
total submission of slaves to their owners. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 25, at 9; Joseph
Conan Thompson, Toward a More Humane Oppression: Florida’s Slave Codes, 1821–1861, 71
FLA. HIST. Q. 324, 324 (1993). Within these slave codes are informant provisions. See, e.g.,
LOUISIANA BLACK CODE § 5 (June 7, 1806), in 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY, supra note 36, at
54–55.
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A. Necessity of Informants
Whites relied on informants out of necessity. Because Whites were
outsiders to the slave community, and thus not personally privy to the
inner workings of that community, detection and investigation of much
slave misconduct would have been nearly impossible without
information from slaves. If Whites were unable to access such otherwise
secreted information, their personal safety, communal safety, financial
interests, and ultimately the institution of slavery would have been
38
seriously threatened. Consequently, the necessity for protection of
White interests was the driving factor respecting the types of offenses or
39
misconduct meriting societal endorsement of slave informing.
Commonly, Whites sought slave informants to detect and prosecute
40
offenses that could result in the loss of White lives.
Additionally,
41
informing was necessary to protect financial interests.
Because slaves could attack or kill their owners, owner awareness of
what was happening among their slaves was a vital preventive measure.
Some owners were desperate for information to protect their personal
42
safety. For example, Martha L. Nelson, a slave owner, wrote her state
Governor seeking her slave’s pardon because he was a valuable
43
informant. She wrote:
[He] would inform on the negroes, as soon as any white person
would, if he knew or suspected anything wrong was plan[n]ing
among them . . . I am almost a maniac from the loss of sleep, now
in the dept[h] of night I write, beseeching you to pardon my
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38. See APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 63 (citing a letter from Martha L. Nelson to
Governor Henry Wise seeking a pardon of her slave); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL,
JORDAN, ROLL 599 (1st ed. 1974).
39. See, e.g., PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE GREAT NEW YORK CONSPIRACY OF 1741:
SLAVERY, CRIME, AND COLONIAL LAW 74–76 (2003).
40. See, e.g., An Additional and Explanatory Act to an Act of the General Assembly of
This Province, Entitled “An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing Negroes and Other
Slaves in This Province;” and for Continuing Such Part of the Said Act as Is Not Altered or
Amended by This Present Act, for the Term Therein Mentioned, no. 790, § VII (1751), in 7
THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 420, 422 (David J. McCord ed., Columbia,
A.S. Johnston 1840) [hereinafter 7 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA].
41. See, e.g., GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 599; NORRECE T. JONES, JR., BORN A CHILD
OF FREEDOM, YET A SLAVE 189–90 (1990).
42. See APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 63 (citing a letter from Martha L. Nelson to
Governor Henry Wise seeking a pardon of her slave). Nelson’s request was unsuccessful. See
id. at 63 n.27.
43. See id. at 63.
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servant . . . such a servant ought not to be sent away particularly
44
in these perilous times of insurrection.
In recognition of the concern for personal safety, legislatures—such
as those in Georgia and South Carolina—enacted statutory provisions
rewarding slaves who provided information regarding poisonings by
slaves. South Carolina’s 1751 Code provided a four-pound reward for
information regarding the attempt to poison an owner that resulted in
45
conviction. In the 1770 and 1848 Georgia Codes, a slave who informed
about the poisoning of another received twenty shillings per year till
46
death and on the day he received the reward was excused from work.
Every negro, mulatto, or mustizoe, who shall hereafter give
information of the intention of any other slave to poison any
person, or of any slave that hath furnished, procured or conveyed
any poison to be administered to any person, shall, upon
conviction of the offender or offenders, be entitled to and
receive from the public of this province, a reward of twenty
shillings, to be paid him or her by the treasurer yearly and every
year, during the abode of such negro, mulatto, or mustizoe in this
province, on the day that such discovery was made, and shall also
be exempted from the labor of his or her master on that
47
day . . . .
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44. See id. (quoting a letter from Martha L. Nelson to Governor Henry Wise seeking a
pardon of her slave).
45. An Additional and Explanatory Act to an Act of the General Assembly of This
Province, Entitled “An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing Negroes and Other Slaves
in This Province;” and for Continuing Such Part of the Said Act as Is Not Altered or
Amended by This Present Act, for the Term Therein Mentioned, no. 790, § VIII (1751), in 7
STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 420, 423.
46. Criminal Law, Persons of Color, and County Regulations, tit. 2, ch. 34, art. 1, § 2(19),
in 4 A CODIFICATION OF THE STATUTE LAW OF GEORGIA 841 (William A. Hotchkiss ed.,
Augusta, Charles E. Grenville, 2d ed. 1848) [hereinafter STATUTE LAW OF GEORGIA];
APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 143 (citing An Act for Ordering and Governing Slaves within
This Province, and for Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of Offences Committed by
Such Slaves, and Other Persons Therein Mentioned, and to Prevent the Inveighling, and
Carrying Away Slaves from Their Masters, Owners, or Employers, §§ 13–14 (1770), in
DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 37, at 426, 430–31).
47. Criminal Law, Persons of Color, and County Regulations, tit. 2, ch. 34, art. 1, § 2(19),
in STATUTE LAW OF GEORGIA, supra note 46, at 841; see also APTHEKER, supra note 37, at
143 (citing An Act for Ordering and Governing Slaves within This Province, and for
Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of Offences Committed by Such Slaves, and Other
Persons Therein Mentioned, and to Prevent the Inveighling, and Carrying Away Slaves from
Their Masters, Owners, or Employers, § 14 (1770), in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE
OF GEORGIA, supra note 37, at 426, 430–31).
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White communities sought state-based rewards for slaves whose
informing efforts protected the White community’s safety by preventing
slave insurrection. The following are descriptions from three legislative
or judicial petitions filed by Whites seeking rewards for slave informing.
First, a slave named Abram, owned by William Kirk, revealed an
alleged plot by Blacks to “massacre” Whites in the community, thereby
preventing the insurrection and resulting in punishment of those
48
(allegedly) involved. For his efforts, ninety-two community members
petitioned the South Carolina Senate to reward Abram for his “highly
49
Additionally, if the
meritorious conduct,” “fidelity and services.”
Senate determined to emancipate Abrams, the petitioners asked that
50
Kirk be compensated “handsome[ly]” for the loss of Abram’s labor.
Second, a slave named Henrietta overheard a slave named Charles
51
conspiring to start an insurrection. Henrietta reported what she heard
to her owner, Ann Paisley. Charles was thus arrested, and upon being
confronted with Henrietta’s information, he confessed, implicating other
52
Blacks.
Because of her informing, “[B]lacks were very generally
excited” against Henrietta and one even attacked her, leading to his
53
execution.
Because of her “fealty” and need for protection, six
members of the community petitioned the legislature to free Henrietta
and her child, provide Paisley a stipend, and indemnify Paisley for the
54
loss of Henrietta.
Third, a slave named Monday, several other slaves, and three White
men, who were selling the slaves as part of an estate sale, were traveling
55
in Georgia. Some of the slaves conspired to kill the White men and
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48. LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM JOHN MCCUMBEE ET AL. TO THE PRESIDENT AND
MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1803), microformed on Race, Slavery, and
Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, Reel 9, Frame 0019
(Univ. Publ’ns of Am.).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM JOHN WILSON ET AL. TO THE PRESIDENT AND
MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1829), microformed on Race, Slavery, and
Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, Reel 10, Frame 0527
(Univ. Publ’ns of Am.) [hereinafter JOHN WILSON ET AL. PETITION].
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Petition to the Court of Pleas for Wake County, North Carolina from Allen Rogers
& Henry Moring, microformed on Race, Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern
County Courts, 1775–1867, at Series 2, Part D, Reel 1, Frame 0043, PAR 21200014 (Univ.
Publ’ns of Am.).
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any slave who would not join the conspiracy.
Having armed
themselves to carry out the plan, they awakened Monday to enlist his
57
involvement. He refused to join, whereupon the conspirators tried to
58
silence him. They were unsuccessful and Monday managed to run and
59
tell of the plot, saving the White men’s lives.
As a result, the
petitioner—one of the saved men—asked the court to emancipate
60
Monday.
Not only did Whites concern themselves with personal and
communal safety, White slave owners worried about protecting and
maximizing their financial interests, and slave informants were able to
assist with this concern as well. Slaves “stole” from their masters in
three ways. First, slaves would “steal” the owner’s personal property,
61
including food and tools. Second, slaves would “steal” the owner’s
rights to the slave’s physical labor or reproduction, by, for example,
62
malingering, stalling, or preventing another from working to capacity.
Finally, at the extreme, slaves would “steal” themselves by running away
63
or assisting other runaways. All of these behaviors by slaves resulted
in the reduction of the owner’s financial interests. To combat these
financial losses, South Carolina rewarded those slaves who provided
information regarding stolen goods:
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56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 599.
62. See id. at 620–21.
63. See id. at 648, 653.
64. An Additional Act to an Act Entitled “An Act for the Better Ordering and
Governing Negroes and All Other Slaves,” no. 344, § VIII (1714), in 7 STATUTES AT LARGE
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 365, 367; see also HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 25, at
173 (citing An Additional Act to an Act Entitled “An Act for the Better Ordering and
Governing Negroes and All Other Slaves,” no. 344, § VIII (1714), in 7 STATUTES AT LARGE
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 365, 367).
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[A]ny negro or slave shall inform any justice of the peace of any
stolen goods sold to any white person by any negro or slave, and
if upon search, by virtue of a warrant from the said justice, the
said goods shall be found and proved to be so stolen, the said
negro or slave so informing, shall receive from the person
offending, the sum of two pounds, over and above the penalty by
64
law appointed.
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States also rewarded slaves for turning in a runaway. For example, in
South Carolina, a slave who informed on a runaway slave received
65
money.
As an interesting aside, even without government sanction, owners
sought informants to protect their personal financial interests. An
owner would want a slave to reveal an assault on another slave, which
66
might reduce productivity. Similarly, owners were interested to know
if a White overseer too harshly punished a slave, thereby preventing a
67
Also, if a White overseer had bad business
slave from working.
acumen or committed crimes against the owner (such as theft), the
68
owner might hope that a slave would provide such information.
Finally, the formal criminal justice process presented means for a
slave owner to prevent other Whites from interfering with the owner’s
interests. In Harrington v. State, a slave owner used one of his slaves to
detect another White community member’s illegal behavior concerning
69
slaves. The slave owner orally gave permission to his slave to purchase
alcohol from an individual the owner suspected of unlawfully selling
70
alcohol to his slaves. The owner also gave his slave money to make the
71
purchase. The transaction occurred and the defendant was charged
72
with distributing alcohol to a slave without written owner permission.
In her defense, the defendant argued consent, i.e., that the owner had
73
given permission for the sale. The court held that the defense was not
available when the consent is:
[A]n experiment to detect a violation of the law. The master’s
delivery of money to a slave, with instructions to buy liquor from
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65. An Act for the Better Ordering of Slaves, no. 57, § VI (1690), in 7 STATUTES AT
LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 343, 345 (stating that if a slave were to “take
up any runaway, he or she shall have the whole benefit thereof”); An Act for the Better
Ordering and Governing of Negroes and Slaves, no. 314, § XXVI (1712) in 7 STATUTES AT
LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 352, 362 (stating that any slave who
delivered a runaway to the owner or master of the slave would receive twenty shillings from
the owner or the marshal).
66. GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 625–27.
67. See id. at 17–19. Owners used slaves to inform on overseers with bad business
acumen, inflicting overly harsh discipline, and committing crimes against the owner. Id.
68. See id.
69. Harrington v. State, 36 Ala. 236, 239, 243 (1860).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 238.
73. Id. at 243.
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a person whom he suspects of having unlawfully sold liquor to
slaves for the purpose of detecting the offender, does not excuse
74
the sale of liquor to the slave for such money.
B. Mere Informants and Active Agents
Evidence firmly reveals that owners received incriminating
75
information from Blacks about other Blacks.
Passive informants
merely provided information that facilitated the detection, investigation,
or punishment of misconduct. Information also demonstrates, however,
that some slaves went a step further and actively assisted in uncovering
or rectifying slave misconduct.
The passive provision of information was the bane of many a
runaway slave. Numerous examples of slaves revealing to owners the
location of a runaway can be found. Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl,
written by Harriet Jacobs using the pseudonym of Linda Brent, is “the
most comprehensive slave narrative written by an Afro-American
76
woman.” Over the many years she hid away, Jacobs’ owner attempted
77
Desperate to locate her, he resorted to soliciting
to find her.
78
In her
information from other Blacks as to her whereabouts.
autobiography, Jacobs writes of one such instance:

Rebellions too were betrayed by the simple act of a slave telling
many or few facts. Well-known rebellions planned by Denmark Vesey
and Gabriel Prosser were undone by slave informants and so too were
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74. Id.
75. See JONES, supra note 41, at 127.
76. See Jean Fagan Yellin, Harriet Ann Jacobs, c. 1813–1897, LEGACY, Fall 1988, at 55,
55–58.
77. HARRIET A. JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL (L. Maria Child
ed., 1861), reprinted in EARLY AFRICAN-AMERICAN CLASSICS, supra note 19, at 111, 222–24.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 222.
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I [Harriet Jacobs] learned that the doctor had written to New
York to a colored woman, who had been born and raised in our
neighborhood, and had breathed his contaminating atmosphere.
He offered her a reward if she could find out [anything] about
me. I know not what was the nature of her reply; but he soon
after started for New York in haste, saying to his family that he
79
had business of importance to transact.
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80

many lesser-known, planned rebellions. Such revelations naturally led
81
to the quashing of the plot before it even started.
In contrast to the passive informant whose work was done once
information was conveyed, the active informant assisted an owner in
detecting or remediating misbehavior. Several scenarios exemplify
various forms of active assistance, including acting as a guide, assisting
in capture, and conducting undercover buys. A slave named Royal
represents the first: acting as a guide. Royal’s story is as follows. Joe
was a notorious runaway slave who eluded capture and continued to
82
hide out four years after murdering a White man. While on the run,
Joe established a camp that could not be found by Whites, yet to which
83
other slaves ran. Joe was reputed to have led his band of outlaws to
84
commit much “mischief.” Community members were “in a constant
state of uneasiness and alarm” and offered many rewards for Joe’s
85
capture. The family of the slain White man offered a reward, as did the
86
State.
Receiving no other assistance from the State, however, the
community established groups to search for Joe and the encampment,
87
but they were unsuccessful. Enter Royal, who physically led a party of
Whites to Joe’s camp and somehow convinced Joe and his followers to
88
make themselves known. As a result, Joe and the other runaways were
89
For his efforts, community members petitioned the South
killed.
90
Carolina Senate to reward Royal.
The story of a slave named Isaac, who allegedly suffered his demise
at the hands of a slave named Jim, demonstrates another type of active
informant: one who effectuates, or attempts to effectuate, the capture of
a slave. Allegedly, Jim killed Isaac based on a belief that Whites had
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80. See discussion infra at Part V.
81. See, e.g., LERONE BENNETT JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK
AMERICA 125–26, 130 (Penguin Books, 6th ed. 1993).
82. See LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM JOHN MAGRANT JR. ET AL. TO THE PRESIDENT
AND MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1824), microformed on Race,
Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, Reel 10,
Frame 0244 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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91

hired Isaac to assist in Jim’s capture. The underlying facts are that Jim
was to be sold to satisfy the debts of his owner, whose property had
92
been attached. Jim ran, becoming one of two runaways who were
93
being concealed by other slaves in the community. The two runaways
learned that Isaac had been hired by Whites executing the attachment to
94
find and betray the runaways. When Isaac was shot through a door at
95
the home of a slave owner, Jim was believed to be the shooter. Jim
96
was found the next morning and arrested for the crime.
Finally, a third type of active informant was the slave who was used
by a White owner to make what would today be called an “undercover
buy.” Harrington v. State, discussed earlier, represents such an
97
instance. In Harrington, a White slave owner provided one of his
slaves with the motive and means to attempt what would be the
98
unlawful purchase of alcohol.
The slave was successful and the
defendant was charged with distributing alcohol to a slave without
99
written owner permission. Though the slave was not knowingly acting
as an informant—or for that matter acting with wrongful intent—this
case still reveals a type of active informant that Whites would use.
III. MOTIVATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE POTENTIAL
INFORMANT
Slaves had many considerations to muse over in deciding whether to
inform. In no particular order, this Part catalogs and exemplifies
primary, though surely not all, concerns. Sometimes the considerations

Id.

C M
Y K

03/17/2014 11:30:34

[A]n experiment to detect a violation of the law. The master’s delivery of money to
a slave, with instructions to buy liquor from a person whom he suspects of having
unlawfully sold liquor to slaves for the purpose of detecting the offender, does not
excuse the sale of liquor to the slave for such money.
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91. See Jim v. State, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 145, 145–46 (1844).
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 146.
95. See id. at 147.
96. Id. at 147–48.
97. See discussion supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
98. Harrington v. State, 36 Ala. 236, 239, 243 (1860).
99. Id. at 238–39. The defendant argued consent, i.e., that the owner had given
permission for the sale. Id. at 243. The court held that the defense was not available because
the consent was:

34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 47 Side A

03/17/2014 11:30:34

DENNIS-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/15/2014 4:38 PM

299

A SNITCH IN TIME

overlapped or required the balancing of interests, and not all factors
necessarily applied to each individual or in a particular circumstance.
Several motivations promoted informing, including loyalty to one’s
owner, self-preservation, criminal leniency, freedom, the right to live
free in a state, and money. Additionally, when slaves needed White
owners to police extreme misconduct by slaves that harmed other slaves,
100
they might inform to spur action. Factors discouraging informing were
preservation of others, slave community loyalty, resistance, and fear of
backlash from other slaves. A slave’s religious convictions either
promoted or discouraged informing, depending on the particular slave
or context.
A. Owner Loyalty and Favor
101
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100. See infra Part III.C.
101. See Rich, supra note 12, at 1518–23.
102. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 62.
103. JONES, supra note 41, at 190; Rory T. Cornish, Camden, South Carolina, Plot
(1816), in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SLAVE RESISTANCE AND REBELLION 97, 97–98 (Junius P.
Rodriguez ed., 2007).
104. JONES, supra note 41, at 190.
105. Id. (citing LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM RICHARD JOHNSON TO THE SPEAKER
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Discussions of snitching invariably raise questions of loyalty.
To
whom does the informant owe his loyalty? Himself? His community?
Which community? The state? Whose loyalty is he betraying by
informing? Is that betrayal acceptable?
102
Some slaves viewed their interests as aligned with their owners.
Thus, fidelity to their owners caused some of these slaves to inform. For
example, Scipio, the “body servant” of his owner, revealed a potential
uprising in Camden, South Carolina, in 1816 in order to save his
103
owner. Scipio was freed as a result of his efforts but continued to work
for his master, although it is unclear whether he was paid for his work or
104
Scipio’s story raises the matter of whether domestic slaves
unpaid.
were more likely to inform than other slaves because of their proximity
to or relationship with their owners. Either proximity or relationship
might encourage owner loyalty. Part VI addresses in detail the
allegation against domestic slaves while this Part discusses the matter
without regard to status.
Jim, a slave, presents another example of the extent to which a slave
would go to protect an owner’s interest. Jim killed another slave who
105
was attacking property Jim’s owner had entrusted to Jim. The same
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106

107

man owned both Jim and the victim. Jim was charged with murder.
His owner, Reverend Richard Johnson, petitioned the legislature for
108
Jim’s release.
Akin to those who informed because of owner loyalty are those
Blacks who did so because of a poor self-image and in an effort to earn
109
White recognition and respect.
Harriet Jacobs, as she hid from her
owner in her grandmother’s attic, observed a free Black man who
informed on other Blacks in order to curry favor:
I was warned to keep extremely quiet, because two guests had
been invited. One was the town constable, and the other was a
free colored man, who tried to pass himself off for white, and
who was always ready to do any mean work for the sake of
110
currying favor with white people.
Lew Cheney, a slave in Louisiana who organized a party of slaves to
escape to Mexico, betrayed his group when he became “convinced of
the ultimate failure of his project, in order to curry favor with his
111
Cheney was apparently successful, as he was eventually
master.”
112
rewarded for his betrayal. Many suspected slaves from his group, on
113
the other hand, were captured and hurriedly executed.
B. Communal Solidarity and Resistance
If a slave viewed loyalty to the slave community as of prime
importance, the slave might also take the position that refusing to
inform evidenced and reinforced communal solidarity and resistance of

03/17/2014 11:30:34
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1838), microformed on
Race, Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1,
Reel 11, Frame 0231 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.) [hereinafter RICHARD JOHNSON PETITION]).
106. JONES, supra note 41, at 190–91 (citing RICHARD JOHNSON PETITION, supra note
105).
107. JONES, supra note 41, at 191 (citing RICHARD JOHNSON PETITION, supra note 105).
108. JONES, supra note 41, at 190–91 (citing RICHARD JOHNSON PETITION, supra note
105); see also JONES, supra note 41, at 128 (documenting slaves’ concerns for the safety of
their owners).
109. See JACOBS, supra note 77, at 226 (describing a free Black “who tried to pass
himself off for white” and would readily inform on other Blacks); JONES, supra note 41, at
190.
110. JACOBS, supra note 77, at 226.
111. JULIUS LESTER, TO BE A SLAVE 118 (1968) (quoting SOLOMON NORTHUP,
TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE 188–89 (Sue Eakin & Joseph Logsdon eds., Library S. Civilization
1975) (1853)).
112. LESTER, supra note 111, at 118 (citing NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 189).
113. Id. (citing NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 189).
AND THE
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authority. Professor Norrece T. Jones contends that historical sources in
South Carolina overwhelmingly support the conclusion that slaves who
114
helped runaways did so voluntarily and reveled in doing so.
His
position stands in stark contrast to Professor Eugene Genovese’s claim
that “slaves often refused to betray organized runaways not because of a
115
sense of solidarity but because of fear of ghastly reprisals.” Both are
likely correct.
In his narrative, Frederick Douglass opined that a slave who refused
to inform was demonstrating fidelity to both the Black community and
116
humanity at large. Douglass wrote:
The slaveholders have been known to send in spies among their
slaves, to ascertain their views and feelings in regard to their
condition. The frequency of this has had the effect to establish
among the slaves the maxim, that a still tongue makes a wise
head. They suppress the truth rather than take the consequences
of telling it, and in so doing prove themselves a part of the
117
human family.
Further, Douglass relates a story he heard when he was a free man in
118
the North. As he writes it, Douglass’s tone indicates pleasant surprise
at the lengths to which escaped slaves would go to protect each other
119
from being sold back into slavery.
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114. JONES, supra note 41, at 168.
115. See id. (quoting EUGENE D. GENOVESE, FROM REBELLION TO REVOLUTION:
AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVE REVOLTS IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 77 (1979)).
116. See DOUGLASS, supra note 19, at 30.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 102–03.
119. See id.
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I found the colored people much more spirited than I had
supposed they would be. I found among them a determination
to protect each other from the blood-thirsty kidnapper, at all
hazards. Soon after my arrival, I was told of a circumstance
which illustrated their spirit. A colored man and a fugitive slave
were on unfriendly terms. The former was heard to threaten the
latter with informing his master of his whereabouts.
Straightaway a meeting was called among the colored people,
under the stereotyped notice, “Business of importance!” The
betrayer was invited to attend. The people came at the
appointed hour, and organized the meeting by appointing a very
religious old gentleman as president, who, I believe, made a
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prayer, after which he addressed the meeting as follows:
“Friends, we have got him here, and I would recommend that you
young men just take him outside the door, and kill him!” With
this, a number of them bolted at him; but they were intercepted
by some more timid than themselves, and the betrayer escaped
their vengeance, and has not been seen in New Bedford since. I
believe there have been no more such threats, and should there
120
be hereafter, I doubt not that death would be the consequence.
C. Communal Regulation
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120. Id.
121. GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 625 (contrasting “ba-ad” men (respected and
admired) and “bad” men (feared)).
122. See id. at 625–27, 629.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 627.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 629.
128. See id. (citing ORVILLE W. TAYLOR, NEGRO SLAVERY IN ARKANSAS 108 (1959))
(describing a situation in which slaves turned in, rather than protected, a runaway who had
killed an overseer).
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While slaves may have refused to cooperate as a measure of
communal solidarity and resistance, at times they found it necessary to
inform in order to ensure the security of the community. Most times,
121
slaves internally controlled miscreants—so called “bad” men —in
order to protect each other and because slave owners ignored the
negative behavior of slaves unless it affected owners’ property and
122
financial interests. However, when internal communal strife reached a
sufficient level that was beyond their ability to control, or desire to
control, slaves turned to their White owners to regulate communal
123
behavior.
To initiate the involvement of an owner, a slave had to
124
reveal the offending conduct.
What type of behavior or person merited this tactic? Bully slaves
125
who assaulted other slaves would be revealed.
Those slaves who
taught slave children immoral behavior, such as how to gamble, were
126
subject to outing.
A slave who shirked responsibilities, thus forcing
127
others to do more work, and a slave whose behavior might cause an
owner to exact penalty upon the entire community could be handed
128
over to an owner. In all these instances, the bad slave would force the

34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 49 Side A

03/17/2014 11:30:34

DENNIS-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/15/2014 4:38 PM

A SNITCH IN TIME

303

normally silent slave into invoking White protection by telling on their
129
caste mates.
D. Communal Ostracism and Retaliation
Professor Eugene Genovese claimed that “slaves often refused to
130
betray organized runaways . . . because of fear of ghastly reprisals.”
Plenty of evidence exists from a variety of sources that slaves who
informed on other slaves were stigmatized by the slave community and
131
faced violent physical retaliation. According to Professor Norrece T.
Jones, all slaves knew that revealing slave misconduct, with limited
132
exceptions, would be viewed as “sacrilegious and sinful.” Even Whites
133
were aware of this viewpoint.
A justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court—obviously White—
confirmed both the nonviolent and violent repercussions in a case in
which a slave informant—Isaac—was allegedly killed by another slave—
134
Jim.
The Isaac-Jim saga was discussed earlier in the context of
135
identifying active slave informants.
In an opinion the justice wrote
reviewing Jim’s conviction, he claimed:

Slave owners too were aware that slaves suspected of or found to be
collaborating were subject to being ostracized, assaulted, or killed.
Petitions formally filed on behalf of slaves by Whites hinted that slaves
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See GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 629.
JONES, supra note 41, at 168 (quoting GENOVESE, supra note 115, at 77).
See, e.g., JONES, supra note 41, at 118.
Id. at 125.
Id.
See Jim v. State, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 145, 151 (1844).
See discussion supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
Jim, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) at 151.
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129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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The truth seems to be that Isaac had not only excited the
enmity of George and Jim, but he seems to have lost caste with
the other negroes in the neighborhood. He had combined with
the white folks to betray George to the sheriff, and it was
thought he was also engaged to apprehend Jim.—This was no
slight offence in their eyes: that one of their own color, subject to
a like servitude, should abandon the interests of his caste, and,
for hire, betray black folks to the white people, rendered him an
object of general aversion. Hence it was, that George and Jim
felt so little hesitation in the utterance of their threats; and hence
136
it was, that Cindy did not wish to destroy Jim for such a fellow.
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who informed on slaves faced or feared retaliation by Blacks.
For
these reasons, slave owners would protect the identities of their
138
informants. For example, in Camden, South Carolina, in 1816, a slave
139
revealed a conspiracy scheduled for July 4, 1816.
Ultimately, the
legislature freed the slave, paid the slave’s owner $1,100, and awarded
140
the slave a life pension of $50.
The slave asked his owner never to
reveal the slave’s name because he did not want to have “to leave this
141
country, and he knew the negroes would not let him live here.”
E. Religion
In the early days of slavery, Whites did not expose slaves to religion
for a variety of reasons, including the belief that slaves did not need
142
religion and the fear that slaves would learn to read and write.
Eventually, Whites believed that slaves who learned religion would be
more subservient and that religion could be a useful tool in maintaining
143
the institution of slavery.
White religious leaders strictly controlled
Blacks’ access to religion and cultivated and enlisted Black religious
144
leaders to assist in detecting and investigating slave misconduct.
Slaves who embraced a religious life told church authorities about
145
formerly private matters handled within the slave community. Some
religious slaves would reveal both moral crimes (e.g., adultery, theft) as
well as political crimes (e.g., not working, being rebellious, running

03/17/2014 11:30:34
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137. E.g., LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM LEWIS BOLAH TO THE SENATE AND THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINA (1824), microformed on
Race, Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1,
Reel 18, Frame 0450, PAR 11682404 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.) [hereinafter LEWIS BOLAH
PETITION]; JOHN WILSON ET AL. PETITION, supra note 51.
138. JONES, supra note 41, at 118–19.
139. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 257.
140. Id. at 258 (citing An Act Making Appropriations for the Extra Session of the
Legislature, in the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventeen; and for Other
Purposes Therein Mentioned, no. 2132, § II, in 6 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 57, 58 (David J. McCord ed., Columbia, A.S. Johnston 1839) [hereinafter 6
STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA]).
141. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 257 (quoting Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman in
Camden, S.C. to His Friend in Philadelphia, Dated July 4, 1816, N.Y. EVENING POST, July 18,
1816, at 2).
142. See JONES, supra note 41, at 131.
143. See id. at 131–32.
144. Id. at 143–44.
145. Id. at 144–45.
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146

away). For example, according to records of the Salem Presbyterian
Church dated August 28, 1831:
Cato Servant of John Shaw, was suspended for Six months for an
assault made upon one of the Church members. Jack servant of
R. Witherspoon, was suspended for six months for charging the
147
above named Cato with theft and Causing the assault.
Others, though religious, distinguished between moral and political
148
Interestingly,
crimes, with the latter not being subject to revelation.
for those who refused to betray political crimes, religion also provided
149
the justification. Some slaves believed it a deific decree not to reveal
150
the whereabouts of runaways, among other “transgressions.”
F. Protection of Others
Closely related to communal solidarity was the desire of a slave to
protect another individual by not informing.
Again, Frederick
151
Douglass’s autobiographical writings are informative.
Before
narrating how he escaped to freedom, Douglass set forth a caveat
regarding his storytelling:
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146. See id. at 143, 145–46.
147. Id. at 143 (quoting SALEM PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (BLAIR, S.C.) SESSION
MINUTES AND REGISTERS, 1831–1946 (Aug. 28, 1831) (on file with Presbyterian Historical
Society)).
148. See JONES, supra note 41, at 146.
149. See id. at 137.
150. See id.
151. See generally DOUGLASS, supra note 19.
152. Id. at 92.

34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 50 Side A

I now come to that part of my life during which I planned, and
finally succeeded in making, my escape from slavery. But before
narrating any of the peculiar circumstances, I deem it proper to
make known my intention not to state all the facts connected
with the transaction. My reasons for pursuing this course may be
understood from the following: First, were I to give a minute
statement of all the facts, it is not only possible, but quite
probable, that others would thereby be involved in the most
embarrassing difficulties. Secondly, such a statement would most
undoubtedly induce greater vigilance on the part of the
slaveholders than has existed heretofore among them; which
would, of course, be the means of guarding a door whereby some
152
dear brother bondsman might escape his galling chains.
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He later reiterated:
But I remained firm, and, according to my resolution, on the
third day of September, 1838, I left my chains, and succeeded in
reaching New York without the slightest interruption of any
kind. How I did so,—what means I adopted,—what direction I
travelled, and by what mode of conveyance,—I must leave
153
unexplained, for the reasons before mentioned.
G. Self-Preservation
When investigating alleged slave misconduct, a slave owner might
have given a slave the choice between dying or providing information
154
about another slave’s misconduct.
Quite naturally, some chose to
155
live. Along a similar vein, some slaves informed in order to prevent or
156
The fallout from Nat Turner’s
stop Whites from torturing them.
157
rebellion provides such an instance.
After learning of Nat Turner’s
planned insurrection, Whites in Harriet Jacobs’ South Carolina town
158
So, they set about to squelch any such
were in fear for their lives.
plans in their town by calling in poor, non-slaveholding Whites to search
159
the houses of and torture free Blacks and slaves.
Jacobs wrote
regarding the impending torture:

“Well, Tom!” said Legree, . . . “do you know I’ve made up my mind to KILL
you?”
“It’s very likely, mas’r,” said Tom, calmly.
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“I have,” said Legree, with grim, terrible calmness, “done—just—that—thing,
Tom, unless you’ll tell me what you know about these yer gals!”
Id. Tom refused to tell and was beaten to death. Id. Later passages reveal him to be
motivated by loyalty to his fellow slaves, religious conviction, and an ethic of resisting his
owner. See id. at 516.
155. JONES, supra note 41, at 127.
156. See id. at 168, 179; see also Alfred L. Brophy, The Nat Turner Trials, 91 N.C. L.
REV. 1817, 1864–65 (2013) (describing the torture of a slave named Dave and others alleged
to be plotting an insurrection in North Carolina, resulting in disclosures).
157. See infra Part VII for a discussion of Nat Turner’s rebellion.
158. See JACOBS, supra note 77, at 161.
159. See id. at 161–62.
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154. See, e.g., HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN, OR, LIFE AMONG THE
LOWLY 514–15 (David S. Reynolds ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (1852). Simon Legree, the
owner of Tom, the fictional protagonist in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, gave
Tom such a choice:
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Poor creatures! They thought it was going to be a holiday. I was
informed of the true state of affairs, and imparted it to the few I
could trust. Most gladly would I have proclaimed it to every
slave; but I dared not. All could not be relied on. Mighty is the
160
power of the torturing lash.
Respecting the choice between withstanding torture and informing,
Jacobs further commented:
One black man, who had not fortitude to endure scourging,
promised to give information about the conspiracy. But it turned
out that he knew nothing at all. He had not even heard the name
of Nat Turner. The poor fellow had, however, made up a story,
which augmented his own sufferings and those of the colored
161
people.
Self-protection also focused on avoiding responsibility for alleged
misconduct. Thus, a slave might inform in order to divert or deflect
162
blame from himself. Lew Cheney, who earlier presented as a striking
and unsympathetic exemplar of a slave seeking to curry favor with
163
Whites, also presents here as a slave strongly motivated by his own
interests. Cheney, a Louisiana slave, organized a group of slaves to run
164
away to Mexico.
However, when he became “convinced of the
165
ultimate failure of his project,” he sought to avoid the negative
consequences that would naturally follow if it were learned that he
166
organized the mass escape.
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160. Id. at 161.
161. Id. at 165.
162. See JONES, supra note 41, at 128.
163. See NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 188–89; see also discussion supra Part III.A.
164. See LESTER, supra note 111, at 118 (citing NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 188).
165. LESTER, supra note 111, at 118 (quoting NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 189).
166. LESTER, supra note 111, at 118 (citing NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 189).
167. LESTER, supra note 111, at 118 (alteration in original) (quoting NORTHUP, supra
note 111, at 189).
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Departing secretly from the encampment, he proclaimed among
the planters the number[s] collected in the swamp, and, instead
of stating truly the object they had in view, asserted their
intention was to emerge from their seclusion the first favorable
167
opportunity, and murder every white person along the bayou.
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Cheney was rewarded while his campmates were captured and
168
executed.
The Negro Plot Trials of 1741 tell the story of northern slaves who
informed—sometimes falsely—to deflect criminal attention, as Whites
were vigorously investigating and prosecuting slaves for a perceived
169
insurrection.
In 1741, a series of fires started throughout New York
170
City.
Whites began to believe that slaves—and possibly some
171
Whites—were starting the fires. Hysteria reigned and Whites targeted
172
Blacks to round up and arrest.
A grand jury was impaneled to
173
investigate. Trials lacking due process—though granting more process
than normally accorded slaves—were quickly held, resulting in many
174
convictions and executions.
In the course of investigating and adjudicating the fires and alleged
conspiracy, monetary rewards and pardons were offered to Whites and
Blacks for information: a free person could receive £100 for information;
a free Black could receive £45 and be pardoned; and a slave could be
freed, receive £20, and be pardoned while his master could receive
175
£25.
Additionally, slaves who came under suspicion informed to
protect themselves from harsh punishment by diverting attention to
176
For example, Sandy—the first slave to confess to the
other slaves.
177
grand jury—was able to save his life through informing.
Quaco and
Cuffee, however, who were both convicted after trial, were still executed
178
after confessing at the last moment. Today, scholars debate whether
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LESTER, supra note 111, at 118 (citing NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 189).
See generally HOFFER, supra note 39.
Id. at 71–73.
Id. at 2, 73–74.
Id.
Id. at 74–80.
See id. at 81–129.
Id. at 75 (citing Minutes of the Common Council of New York, April 11, 1741, in 5
MINUTES OF THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1675–1776, at 17 (1905)).
176. HOFFER, supra note 39, at 125–28. Whites too were frequent informers. Id. at 76–
77, 82. Whites, particularly White servants, informed on Blacks and other Whites; some
received freedom and compensation (e.g., Mary Burton—a White servant, and the first grand
jury witness). Id. at 82, 166; MAT JOHNSON, THE GREAT NEGRO PLOT: A TALE OF
CONSPIRACY AND MURDER IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 99–100 (2007).
177. HOFFER, supra note 39, at 88–89, 91, 116.
178. Id. at 102–03. Quaco and Cuffee, convicted and sentenced to death by immolation,
confessed at the last hour but were still executed. Id. Confessions by slaves were admissible
in criminal cases of slaves, though confessions by slaves to law enforcement or corrections
officers were given little weight because the slave’s “habit of obedience . . . compels him to
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there was an actual concerted plot by slaves, a hoax, or something in
179
between.
Nonetheless, the available evidence confirms that slaves
were motivated by self-preservation to inform on other slaves.
H. Criminal Leniency
Slaves who were involved in unlawful conspiracies obtained
sentencing leniency, such as the avoidance of execution, by testifying
180
against other slaves. For example, a slave named John was convicted
of conspiracy and attempted insurrection after he confessed and pled
181
guilty.
Having testified against other slaves, he was sentenced to be
sold out of the United States rather than executed, which was the usual
182
punishment for his crime.
In another instance, a slave named Paul,
also known as Figaro, was involved in an insurrection plot in
183
Charleston. He testified against other slaves who were convicted and
184
executed.
Paul’s sentence, however, was reduced from execution to
185
sale out of the country. Similarly, Moses, one of the early participants
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answer all questions of the idlest curiosity, while his mendacious disposition will always
involve even the most innocent in the most contradictory inconsistencies.” The Law of Negro
Slavery, ch. 18, § 315, in 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 3, 271 (Thomas R. R. Cobb ed., Phila., T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1858)
[hereinafter LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY]. Confessions by slaves to their masters were
inadmissible in criminal cases against slaves because “slave[s] [were] always ready to
mould . . . answers so as to please the master, and . . . no confidence [could] be placed in the
truth of his statements.” The Law of Negro Slavery, ch. 18, § 317, in LAW OF NEGRO
SLAVERY, supra, at 3, 272.
179. See HOFFER, supra note 39, at 1–9.
180. Unquestionably and uniformly, slaves were incompetent to be witnesses in cases for
or against free Whites. The Law of Negro Slavery, ch. 13, §§ 247, 253, in LAW OF NEGRO
SLAVERY, supra note 178, at 3, 226, 230. Exclusion was justified on the grounds that slaves
were “servile” and “mendacious.” The Law of Negro Slavery, ch. 13, §§ 247, 256, in LAW OF
NEGRO SLAVERY, supra note 178, at 3, 226, 233. In cases involving only slaves or free
Blacks, slaves were permitted to serve as witnesses. The Law of Negro Slavery, ch. 13, § 253,
in LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY, supra note 178, at 3, 230.
181. See LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM JOSEPH ENSLOW TO THE PRESIDENT AND
MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1831), microformed on Race, Slavery, and
Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, Reel 11, Frame 0007
(Univ. Publ’ns of Am.).
182. See id. He died while imprisoned awaiting sale. Id. His owner sought
compensation from the State. Id.
183. See LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM JAMES DELAIRE TO PRESIDENT JOHN WARD
AND THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1798), microformed on Race,
Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, Reel 8,
Frame 0482 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.).
184. Id.
185. Id. While awaiting sale, his toes on one of his feet rotted and his foot fell off. Id.
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in the Nat Turner rebellion in Southampton, Virginia, was caught and
186
charged with murder and conspiracy.
He, however, provided
187
Though he was convicted
important testimony against other slaves.
and sentenced to death in spite of his cooperation, the court
“recommended that the governor commute his sentence to
188
transportation out[] of the state.” Finally, a Louisiana court expressly
held that a jury had the discretion to commute a capital sentence,
189
presumably for informing, if it so desired.
I. Manumission
The prospect of manumission was a strong motivator for
190
informing. In the early years of slavery, owners could free slaves by
191
Over time, legislatures began to publicly
will as a private matter.
regulate manumission: freeing slaves became illegal except with
192
government approval, whether executive or legislative.
Only the most helpful of informants were eligible for manumission.
In Louisiana as of 1831, with legislative approval, an owner could
emancipate a slave “for long, faithful or important services rendered to
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His owner, James Delaire, petitioned for compensation due to the reduced sale value of Paul.
Id.
186. See infra Part VII for a description of the Turner rebellion. For more discussion
regarding Moses, see Brophy supra note 156 at 1825 & n.45 (citing EXTRACT FROM THE
COURT RECORDS OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA (1831), reprinted in HENRY
IRVING TRAGLE, THE SOUTHAMPTON SLAVE REVOLT OF 1831: A COMPILATION OF
SOURCE MATERIAL 177, 185–86, 200–01, 220–21 (1971)).
187. Brophy, supra note 156, at 1825 n.45 (citing EXTRACT FROM THE COURT
RECORDS OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA, supra note 186, at 185–86, 200–01, 220–
21).
188. Brophy, supra note 156 at 1825 n.45 (citing EXTRACT FROM THE COURT RECORDS
OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA supra note 186, at 221).
189. See State v. Slave Jack, 14 La. Ann. 385, 386 (1859) (holding that a jury has
discretion to commute a capital sentence). In this case, the jury commuted the sentence, but
did not reveal the grounds for doing so, suggesting that informing could possibly have been
the reason. See id. at 385.
190. JONES, supra note 41, at 127.
191. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 219 (2d ed. 1985)
(identifying Virginia and Maryland as allowing private manumission).
192. E.g., An Act to Restrain the Emancipation of Slaves, and to Prevent Free Persons
of Color from Entering into This State; and for Other Purposes, no. 2236, § I (1820), in 7
STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 459 (providing that
emancipation may only occur by legislative act); An Act to Determine the Mode of
Emancipating Slaves Who Have Not Attained the Age Required by the Civil Code for Their
Emancipation (1827), in 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY, supra note 36, at 59–60.
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193

himself or family.”
Similarly, the Louisiana Code provided in 1851
that governors could free, as well as pardon or commute the sentences
194
of, slave informants.
The Virginia legislature permitted freedom for
195
“meritorious services, to be judged of by the Governor and Council.”
196
Revelation of a slave conspiracy constituted “[m]eritorious services.”
In South Carolina, a slave could be emancipated if the slave, “in
actual invasion, kill[s] or take[s] one or more of our enemies, and the
same shall prove, by any white person, to be done by him, shall, for his
reward, at the charge of the public, have and enjoy his freedom, for such
197
his taking or killing, as aforesaid.”
Finally, in North Carolina,
emancipation could be sought for informants who revealed the
198
Toney, a slave owned by Samuel White,
whereabouts of runaways.
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193. An Act to Amend an Act Entitled “An Act to Prevent Free Persons of Colour
from Entering into This State and for Other Purposes,” § 2 (1831), in 2 STATUTES ON
SLAVERY, supra note 36, at 73.
194. See McDowell v. Couch, 6 La. Ann. 365, 370 (1851) (citing An Act to Amend an
Act Entitled “An Act Supplementary to an Act for the Punishment of Crimes and
Misdemeanors,” and Other Supplementary Acts, Passed on the Twentieth March, Eighteen
Hundred and Eighteen, Crimes and Misdemeanors, no. 18, § 1 (1823), in 1 A GENERAL
DIGEST OF THE ACTS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF LOUISIANA: PASSED FROM THE YEAR 1804,
TO 1827, INCLUSIVE, AND IN FORCE AT THIS LAST PERIOD, WITH AN APPENDIX AND
GENERAL INDEX 403 (L. Moreau Lislet ed., New Orleans, Banjamin Levy 1828) [hereinafter
DIGEST OF LOUISIANA]). Upon petition, the Governor or Senate had authority to commute
a slave’s death sentence to life in prison “whenever the circumstances of the case are such as
to entitle the offender to such commutation.” McDowell, 6 La. Ann. at 370 (quoting An Act
to Amend an Act Entitled “An Act Supplementary to an Act for the Punishment of Crimes
and Misdemeanors,” and Other Supplementary Acts, Passed on the Twentieth March,
Eighteen Hundred and Eighteen, Crimes and Misdemeanors, no. 18, § 1 (1823), in DIGEST OF
LOUISIANA, supra, at 403). Presumably, such “circumstances” would include informing.
195. An Act Reducing into One, the Several Acts Concerning Slaves, Free Negroes and
Mulattoes, no. C.111, § 53 (1819), in 1 THE REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA:
BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OF A PUBLIC AND
PERMANENT NATURE, AS NOW ARE IN FORCE; WITH A GENERAL INDEX 421, 433–34 & n.*
(Richmond, Thomas Ritchie 1819) [hereinafter CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA] (stating
that in 1723, the Virginia legislature enacted a statute preventing emancipation by will; the
statute continued in force until 1748).
196. An Act Reducing into One, the Several Acts Concerning Slaves, Free Negroes and
Mulattoes, no. C.111, § 53 (1819), in CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 195, at
433–34 & n.*; HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 25, at 48.
197. An Act for Enlisting Such Trusty Slaves as Shall Be Thought Serviceable to This
Province in Time of Alarms, no. 278, § V (1708), in 7 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 349, 350.
198. E.g., Petition to the County Court of Quarter Sessions for the County of
Pasquotank, North Carolina from J. Banks et al. (1972), microformed on Race, Slavery, and
Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1775–1867, at Series 2, Part D, Reel 1, Frame
0138, PAR 21279202 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.).
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learned of a plan by slaves and the owner of a ship to convey the slaves
199
North.
Toney revealed the plan and some of the slaves were
200
To reward his revelation, a group of sixteen White
thwarted.
201
community members petitioned the court to free Toney.
J. Remaining in State
A desirable reward closely connected to emancipation was the
ability of an ex-slave to remain in state near one’s family and home.
Thus, legislatures also sanctioned this reward for informing. In Virginia,
after May 1, 1806, any slave “emancipated for ‘an act, or acts of’
202
extraordinary merit” could apply to remain in state.
On the other
hand, a slave emancipated by will was required to leave state within
203
twelve months.
Lewis Bolah represents an example in which a slave informant, who
had been emancipated for revealing a rebellion, petitioned to remain in
state after emancipation. While he could not have independently sought
204
his emancipation, as a free man he could ask to remain in state.
In
1812, Bolah revealed an insurrection plot among slaves, free people of
color, and “a few abandoned and lawless White persons” in New
205
Orleans.
In 1813, the governor of Louisiana granted Bolah, and
206
others, freedom. Fearing for his safety in New Orleans, he sought to
207
He petitioned the Virginia House to allow him to
leave Louisiana.
reside in Richmond, near where he had lived before he was sold down
208
south to New Orleans.
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199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. An Act Reducing into One, the Several Acts Concerning Slaves, Free Negroes and
Mulattoes, no. C.111, § 62 (1819), in CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 195, at
436.
203. An Act Reducing into One, the Several Acts Concerning Slaves, Free Negroes and
Mulattoes, no. C.111, § 61 (1819), in CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 195, at
436. Slave could be emancipated by will. An Act Reducing into One, the Several Acts
Concerning Slaves, Free Negroes and Mulattoes, no. C.111, § 53 (1819), in CODE OF THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 195, at 433–34.
204. LEWIS BOLAH PETITION, supra note 137.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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Similarly, a former slave emancipated by self-purchase could
209
petition to remain in state. Moses, a slave, purchased his freedom. He
petitioned the court to allow him to remain in the state but the petition
210
was denied for lack of “extraordinary merit.” In this petition, he had
avowed that he had served his mistress well, was of good character, had
saved his mistress from a house fire, and was “always . . . watchful to
detect and desirous to suppress those mischiefs and vices in slaves and
211
free Persons of Colour.” Apparently this was an insufficient basis to
remain in the state. He successfully re-petitioned, avowing:
In times when there were frequent alarms of insurrections of the
Blacks, when in the neighborhood, where [their] number was
great being near large estates and extensive coal mines your
Petitioner has more than once secretly made known to his
Mistress the whispers of such plots being agitated and concerning
them [h]e was always distressed and anxious to make
212
discoveries.
K. Monetary Reward
Surprisingly, monetary rewards to slave informants—either in
213
conjunction with or distinct from emancipation—were available.
Blacks as a class were prevented by law from both personal freedom and
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209. LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM MOSES TO THE LEGISLATURE OF VIRGINIA (1822),
microformed on Race, Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–
1867, at Series 1, Reel 18, Frame 0349, PAR 11682205 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.) [hereinafter
MOSES PETITION].
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.; see also APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 273 n.26 (“In times when there were
frequent alarms of insurrections of the Blacks, in the neighborhood, where [their] . . . number
was great being near large estates and extensive coal mines your Petitioner has more than
once secretly made known to his Mistress the whispers of such Plots being agitated and
concerning them he was always distressed and anxious to make discoveries.” (alteration in
original) (quoting MOSES PETITION, supra note 209)).
213. See, e.g., APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 143 (citing An Act for Ordering and
Governing Slaves within This Province, and for Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of
Offences Committed by Such Slaves, and Other Persons Therein Mentioned, and to Prevent
the Inveighling, and Carrying Away Slaves from Their Masters, Owners, or Employers,
§§ 13–14 (1770), in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 37, at 426,
430–31); HOFFER, supra note 39, at 75 (citing Minutes of the Common Council of New York,
April 11, 1741, in 5 MINUTES OF THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1675–
1776, at 17 (1905)). These rewards were not part of the system of rewards available to Whites
who acted as “informers” or private prosecutors. See discussion supra notes 35–36 and
accompanying text.
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possession of property, thereby ensuring and fortifying their complete
214
marginalization.
The permissibility of a monetary reward for
informing thus reveals the lengths to which Whites were willing to go in
order to obtain highly valuable information. Monetary rewards could
215
also serve as a strong motivator to slaves.
As with manumission, a slave entitled to a monetary reward had to
216
have performed exceptional acts.
Slaves who betrayed insurrections
217
In 1822, the South Carolina legislature
received monetary rewards.
emancipated Peter Desverneys, a slave who revealed the Denmark
218
Vesey insurrection plot. In addition to his freedom, Desverneys was
219
In 1857, he petitioned the legislature for an
awarded $50 per year.
220
increase in his annuity due to old age and poor health.
He was
221
supported by multiple members of the community.
Slaves who assisted slaveholders in capturing runaways received
222
monetary rewards. Recall that Georgia and South Carolina provided
223
monetary rewards to slaves revealing poisonings, and South Carolina
224
also did so for slaves disclosing stolen property.
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214. See The Law of Negro Slavery, ch. 14, § 258, in LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY, supra
note 178, at 3, 235. Slaves were legally prevented from owning property. Id. A slave’s person
and his time were the property of his master; thus, any earnings or property resulting from his
labor became the property of his master. The Law of Negro Slavery, ch. 14, §§ 258, 261, in
LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY, supra note 178, at 3, 235, 237.
215. See JONES, supra note 41, at 127.
216. See, e.g., An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing of Negroes and Slaves, no.
314, § XXVI (1712), in 7 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 352,
362.
217. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 41, at 179.
218. See LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM PETER DESVERNEYS TO THE STATE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SITTING IN GENERAL
ASSEMBLY (1857), microformed on Race, Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern
Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, Reel 11, Frame 0617 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.) [hereinafter
PETER DESVERNEYS PETITION]; see also discussion infra Part V.
219. PETER DESVERNEYS PETITION, supra note 218.
220. Id.
221. Id. (indicating that this request was apparently granted and his annuity was raised
to $150 per year).
222. JONES, supra note 41, at 168.
223. An Additional and Explanatory Act to an Act of the General Assembly of This
Province, Entitled “An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing Negroes and Other Slaves
in This Province;” and for Continuing Such Part of the Said Act as Is Not Altered or
Amended by This Present Act, for the Term Therein Mentioned, no. 790, § VIII (1751), in 7
STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 420, 423; APTHEKER, supra
note 37, at 143 (citing An Act for Ordering and Governing Slaves within This Province, and
for Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of Offences Committed by Such Slaves, and Other
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Outside the government-backed system of monetary rewards, slave
owners offered money for assistance. For example, recall that Harriet
Jacobs’ owner offered money to a colored woman living in New York in
225
exchange for information about Harriet’s whereabouts. Jacobs’ owner
suspected Jacobs was living in New York, although she was hiding right
226
under his nose. The offer was apparently unsuccessful—either for the
woman’s unwillingness to inform or lack of information—as Harriet
227
continued in hiding for many years thereafter. Henry Bibb, however,
228
In July 1839, Bibb, a fugitive slave, returned to
was not so lucky.
229
Kentucky, where his mother, wife, and child lived.
He intended to
230
free his wife and child. When he arrived, he called on his mother at
231
“[A] little slave girl” was in the house with his mother
her house.
232
when he entered. The girl acted as if she were asleep, and listened to
233
the whole conversation, which she then reported. Bibb laid low for a
234
while, hoping that his owner would believe the slave girl was lying. It
almost worked, until he was betrayed by a “new” friend, who was a
slave, “for the sum of five dollars,” which had been offered by Bibb’s
235
owner.
A variety of motivations underlay Blacks’ decisions to inform during
slavery. Some of the drivers were rooted in loyalty—whether to one’s
owner, the Black community, self, or another slave.
Other
considerations constituted rewards such as criminal leniency, money,
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Persons Therein Mentioned, and to Prevent the Inveighling, and Carrying Away Slaves from
Their Masters, Owners, or Employers, §§ 13–14 (1770), in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 37, at 426, 430–31) (stating that a Georgia informer received
twenty shillings per year till death and was excused from work on the day he received the
reward).
224. An Additional Act to an Act Entitled “An Act for the Better Ordering and
Governing Negroes and All Other Slaves,” no. 344, § VIII (1714), in 7 STATUTES AT LARGE
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 365, 367.
225. JACOBS, supra note 77, at 222.
226. Id.
227. See generally JACOBS, supra note 77.
228. Compare id. at 222, with HENRY BIBB, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE AND
ADVENTURES OF HENRY BIBB: AN AMERICAN SLAVE 85–86 (Charles J. Hegler ed., Univ. of
Wis. Press 2001) (1849).
229. BIBB, supra note 228, at 84–86.
230. Id. at 86–87.
231. Id. at 84.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 84–85.
234. See id. at 86.
235. Id.
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freedom, and continued in-state residency. Finally, avoidance of
community intimidation, religious belief, and indigenous communal
regulation might be factors.
IV. A CODE OF SILENCE
Conclusively determining whether Blacks—individually or
collectively—adhered to a code of silence is problematic for it is
generally difficult to prove a negative. Nonetheless, comparison of
information from sources with different interests affords the opportunity
236
to consider the possibility.
Additionally, data may be gleaned from
evidence of coping mechanisms adopted by Blacks in response to
237
slavery.
Both slaveholders and slaves provide proof that Blacks kept their
tongues silent regarding the misdeeds of other Blacks. Historian
Eugene Genovese noted that owners of slaves perceived slaves to be
238
unwilling to betray each other.
For example, Reverend C.C. Jones
opined:
[T]he Negroes are scrupulous on one point[,] they make common
cause, as servants, in concealing their faults from their owners.
Inquiry elicits no information; no one feels at liberty to disclose
the transgressor; all are profoundly ignorant; the matter assumes
239
the sacredness of a “professional secret.”
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236. See DOUGLASS, supra note 19, at 92; GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 622; Josiah
Henson, The Life of Josiah Henson, Formerly a Slave, Now an Inhabitant of Canada (1849), in
1 I WAS BORN A SLAVE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF CLASSIC SLAVE NARRATIVES 719, 746 (Yuval
Taylor ed., 1999); JONES, supra note 41, at 167–70.
237. See GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 437.
238. Id. at 622.
239. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting CHARLES C. JONES, THE RELIGIOUS
INSTRUCTION OF THE NEGROES IN THE UNITED STATES 130 (Savannah, Thomas Purse
1842)).
240. See GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 622 (citing C.W. Gooch, Prize Essay on
Agriculture in Virginia, 1 FARMERS’ REG. 121, 124 (1833)).
241. GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 622 (quoting WHITEMARSH B. SEABROOK, AN
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C.W. Gooch suggested that “no greater crime existed for the slaves
240
than that of betraying one another to the whites.”
Similarly,
Whitemarsh B. Seabrook stated: “Between slaves on the same
plantation there is a deep sympathy of feeling which binds them so
closely together that a crime committed by one of their number is
241
seldom discovered through their instrumentality.”
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More narrowly, with respect to the troubling and costly problem of
runaways, slaveholders were acutely aware that runaways could not
have been successful without the help of other slaves on the plantation
242
and elsewhere.
Help consisted not simply of refusing to reveal the
existence of a runaway, but seemingly also of killing and burying
243
tracking dogs, and providing food, shelter, and weapons.
The individual stories of runaway slaves confirm the ethic of silence
that troubled slaveholders. In his narrative, Josiah Henson, an escaped
slave, recalled receiving the assistance of a slave who expected that
Henson would never reveal the assistance:
It was a dark, moonless night, and we got into the little skiff in
which I had induced a fellow-slave to take us across the river. It
was an agitating and solemn moment. The good fellow who was
rowing us over, said this affair might end in his death; “but,” said
he, “you will not be brought back alive, will you?” “Not if I can
help it,” I answered. “And if you are overpowered and return,”
he asked, “will you conceal my part of the business?” “That I
will, so help me God,” I replied. “Then I am easy,” he answered,
244
“and wish you success.”
Similarly, Frederick Douglass, when writing his narrative, revealed
an unwillingness to disclose the names of those who helped him as he
245
escaped to the North.
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ESSAY ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SLAVES, AND ESPECIALLY, ON THEIR RELIGIOUS
INSTRUCTION 12 (Charleston, A.E. Miller 1834)).
242. JONES, supra note 41, at 167, 170.
243. Id. at 167–68.
244. Henson, supra note 236, at 746.
245. DOUGLASS, supra note 19, at 92.
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I now come to that part of my life during which I planned, and
finally succeeded in making, my escape from slavery. But before
narrating any of the peculiar circumstances, I deem it proper to
make known my intention not to state all the facts connected
with the transaction. My reasons for pursuing this course may be
understood from the following: First, were I to give a minute
statement of all the facts, it is not only possible, but quite
probable, that others would thereby be involved in the most
embarrassing difficulties. Secondly, such a statement would most
undoubtedly induce greater vigilance on the part of slaveholders
than has existed heretofore among them; which would, of course,
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be the means of guarding a door whereby some dear brother
246
bondman might escape his galling chains.
He further wrote regarding his escape story:
But I remained firm, and, according to my resolution, on the
third day of September, 1838, I left my chains, and succeeded in
reaching New York without the slightest interruption of any
kind. How I did so,—what means I adopted,—what direction I
travelled, and by what mode of conveyance,—I must leave
247
unexplained, for the reasons before mentioned.
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246. Id.
247. Id. at 97.
248. See James A. Delle & Jason Shellenhamer, Archaeology at the Parvin Homestead:
Searching for the Material Legacy of the Underground Railroad, HIST. ARCHAEOLOGY, no. 2,
2008 at 38, 39–40.
249. See id.
250. DOUGLASS, supra note 19, at 30.
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Additionally, the Underground Railroad stands as unquestionable
proof of an ability and a willingness of slaves to maintain silence
248
The number of slaves successfully escaping via
regarding runaways.
the Underground Railroad is unknown; however, the number of
successful escapees is undoubtedly small in proportion to the number of
249
slaves.
Nevertheless, the fact of its existence—which is
unquestionable—as well as its efficacy and lasting nature presents strong
evidence of a slave code of silence. Without Blacks keeping the secrets
of those attempting escape, success would have been highly unlikely for
any escapee.
Evidence suggests that not only did Blacks withhold information
regarding runaway slaves, they also were unwilling to disclose more
mundane forms of misconduct. Douglass wrote: “The slaveholders have
been known to send in spies among their slaves, to ascertain their views
and feelings in regard to their condition. The frequency of this has had
the effect to establish among the slaves the maxim, that a still tongue
250
makes a wise head.”
Finally, while refusal to divulge information to Whites was
apparently desirable behavior among some slaves, sometimes it was
necessary to surreptitiously communicate about impermissible subjects
in front of Whites and potential informants. Thus, slaves developed a
system of coded language to prevent outsiders and informants from
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251

understanding their conversations. As explained by Professor Eugene
Genovese, slaves—in particular field slaves—developed a language and
252
style of speaking all their own.
Not only did their language allow
slaves from different African cultures to communicate, but it prevented
outsiders from understanding what was being said. Thus, slaves,
particularly field slaves, were able “to communicate with each other in
the presence of whites with some measure of safety,” which “helped
immeasurably to prevent informers from having too much to convey to
253
the masters beyond impressions and suspicions.”
Available evidence makes clear that some Blacks held a personal
ethic against providing incriminating information about other Blacks to
Whites. Additionally, there is support for the proposition that Blacks
on the whole adhered to a code of silence. Nonetheless, without more
information, drawing a definite conclusion as to the existence of a
communal ethic of silence is premature.
V. THE ULTIMATE BETRAYAL
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GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 437.
Id. at 431–41.
See id. at 437.
JONES, supra note 41, at 127.
See id. at 145, 189.
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Black informers during slavery revealed all manner of Black
254
255
misconduct, including assaults, rivalries, sexual infidelities, and theft.
As the discussion in Part III evidences, such revelations might spur
ostracism if not actual retaliation.
However, a Black person’s
willingness to disclose a plan of rebellion or the location of a runaway
might be characterized as the ultimate form of betrayal whether viewed
from the perspective of the enslaved or their owners.
Given the complete legal and social oppression of the enslaved, it is
reasonable to hypothesize that freedom and liberty—or the possibilities
thereof—were extremely valued by slaves. Two potential means of
successfully achieving these states were rebellion and escape.
Consequently, it stands to reason that a Black person who revealed a
slave insurrection or the whereabouts of a runaway might become
greatly reviled, unless arguably the revelation was made with good
cause, such as because of torture.
Slave owners and Whites too placed high value on the willingness of
Blacks to inform on rebels and, to a slightly smaller extent, runaways.
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Evidence of such high value can be found in the granting of freedom to
256
some slaves who revealed insurrections.
A slave who demonstrated
loyalty to Whites and protected their interests garnered the greatest
reward.
Notwithstanding that divulgences of the plans of rebels or runaways
might merit extreme contempt from Blacks, such betrayals are welldocumented. Researchers have substantiated numerous instances in
257
which planned rebellions were betrayed beforehand by slaves. Indeed,
Professor Norrece Jones notes that many slaves believed rebellions were
258
always betrayed beforehand.
Two well-known rebellions that were
betrayed before they got underway include the Gabriel Prosser
rebellion in Richmond, Virginia, in 1800 and the Denmark Vesey
259
rebellion in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1822.
During the spring and summer of 1800, Prosser planned his
260
261
rebellion. By August, several thousand slaves had been enlisted. On
262
the day it was to begin, August 30, two slaves, Tom and Pharaoh,
263
The
betrayed the plot to their master who in turn told authorities.
264
governor called out the militia. Prosser did not know of the betrayal
265
and that night approximately 1,000 slaves gathered. A thunderstorm
prevented them from attacking when the storm washed out points of
266
267
entry into the city.
So, Prosser postponed the attack.
He fled by
boat but was located in Norfolk, Virginia, on September 25, 1800, by
268
Prosser and many co“two Negroes” who ultimately betrayed him.
conspirators were arrested before they could re-assemble to carry out
269
the insurrection.
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256. See discussion supra Part III.I.
257. See, e.g., APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 170, 173–74, 189, 222; JONES, supra note 41,
at 179.
258. JONES, supra note 41, at 191 (citing THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON, ARMY
LIFE IN A BLACK REGIMENT 248 (Boston, Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1870)).
259. BENNETT, supra note 81, at 125–31.
260. Id. at 125.
261. Id. at 126.
262. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 221.
263. Id.; BENNETT, supra note 81, at 126.
264. BENNETT, supra note 81, at 126.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 222.
269. BENNETT, supra note 81, at 126.
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Denmark Vesey sought to strike Charleston, South Carolina, in
270
271
1822.
Peter Poyas was Vesey’s second-in-command.
Poyas
272
identified house slaves as the most likely of betrayers. “He told one of
his recruiting agents to ‘take care and don’t mention it to those waiting
men who receive presents of old coats, etc., from their masters, or they’ll
273
betray us: I will speak to them.’”
Notwithstanding Poyas’ command,
some slaves ignored his instruction because they knew of house slaves
274
“willing to poison their masters’ wells.”
The attack was planned for
275
276
July 16, 1822. An estimated 9,000 slaves had been enlisted.
Authorities detected the plan in the last week of May when a slave
277
named William Paul tried to recruit Peter Devaney, a house slave.
Devaney betrayed the group by consulting a free Black named William
278
Pencil who advised Devaney to tell his master, which he did.
279
However, Devaney was only able to give authorities a barebones plan.
Recruits knew only the name of their assigned leader and general
280
plans. Only leaders of the plot knew details, in order to prevent the
arrest or betrayal of one person from resulting in the collapse of the
281
entire plan.
For two weeks, Vesey continued to plan and the government
282
283
authorities investigated. Vesey moved up the date of attack. On the
Friday before the new scheduled day, the group was betrayed again, this
284
time by a slave who knew plans and some names.
George Wilson,
another slave and leader in the African Church, also provided
285
information.
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270. Id. at 127–31.
271. Id. at 128.
272. Id. at 129.
273. Id.; see also APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 270–71.
274. JONES, supra note 41, at 178; see also APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 270–71.
275. BENNETT, supra note 81, at 130.
276. See id. at 129.
277. Id. at 130; JONES, supra note 41, at 179.
278. JONES, supra note 41, at 179; see also APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 271 (spelling the
free Black’s name as “Pencell”).
279. BENNETT, supra note 81, at 130.
280. Id. at 129.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 130.
283. Id. at 131.
284. Id.
285. JONES, supra note 41, at 179.
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Vesey and five leaders were tried, convicted, and executed on July 2,
286
287
1822.
“Only one leader confessed,” all others “remained silent.”
Devaney and Wilson were emancipated by the legislature and given
288
289
lifetime pensions. Pencil received $1,000 and a tax exemption.
Both before and after the planned Prosser and Vesey rebellions,
slaves betrayed in advance many lesser-known insurrections. An early
instance is the betrayal by Will of a conspiracy by slaves in Surrey and
290
James City Counties, Virginia, in 1710. A few years later, in 1713 in
Goose Creek, South Carolina, a slave named Job revealed a
291
conspiracy. In Charles Town, South Carolina in 1740, a slave named
Peter revealed a conspiracy twenty-four hours before it was to be
initiated, allowing slaveholders to capture the rebels and execute
292
them.
In 1835 in South Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana, domestic slaves
293
revealed slave plots against Whites.
In October 1837, in Rapides
Parish, Louisiana, Lewis, a slave, revealed a conspiracy of slaves and
294
His
free Blacks that was set to begin in Alexandria, Louisiana.
295
revelation led the conspiracy to be squelched. The state freed Lewis
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286. BENNETT, supra note 81, at 131.
287. Id.
288. JONES, supra note 41, at 179.
289. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 271 n.21 (citing An Act for the Remuneration of
Peter, of George Pencil, and of — Scott, no. 2299, § V, in 6 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, supra note 140, at 194, 195) (calling him “Pencell” and mentioning only $1,000);
JONES, supra note 41, at 179.
290. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 170. Will was rewarded by the legislature purchasing
his freedom for £40. Id.
291. See id. at 173–74. An entry in the Journals of the Commons House of the
Assembly, Columbia, South Carolina indicates that the Assembly agreed to pay a slave
named Job £5 for revealing in 1713 a slave conspiracy. Id. at 174 (quoting MS JOURNALS OF
THE COMMONS HOUSE OF THE ASSEMBLY OF SOUTH CAROLINA (May 11, 1715),
microformed on Collection of Early State Records, A.1b, Reel 1, Unit 4 (Lib. of Congress)).
292. See APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 189 & n.77. Peter was awarded a suit, hat, shoes,
stockings, and £20. Id. at 189 n.77.
293. See id. at 328 (recounting how, in October 1835, in South Carolina and Georgia,
“[a]n old domestic slave revealed . . . a plan for rebellion”); id. at 329 (“In December
[1835,] . . . a ‘confidential servant’ . . . in East Feliciana, Louisiana” revealed a serious plot by
two Whites and “a great many of the most favorite confidential servants,” making “it all the
more disturbing.” (quoting Letter to a Member of Congress, Dated December 29, 1835, from
New Orleans, 49 NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER 331 (1836))).
294. See APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 330.
295. Id. at 330.
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and rewarded him with $500 to “establish himself in some distant
296
community where he would be safe.”
In June 1853, in New Orleans, Louisiana, Albert, a slave, asked
297
George Wright, a free Black, to join a rebellion in the planning.
Wright expressed interest and Albert took Wright to meet Dyson, a
298
White teacher from Jamaica. Dyson, trusting Wright, urged Wright to
299
join.
Wright seemed committed, but immediately revealed the plot,
300
In July 1859, in Clarksburg, Virginia (now
leading police to Albert.
301
West Virginia), a female slave revealed a plot.
As with rebellions, research also establishes examples of instances in
which slaves betrayed escapees. Disclosing their whereabouts could be
serious betrayal. Henry Bibb, a runaway slave, was betrayed not once
302
but twice. In 1840, Lew Cheney, a slave, had organized “a mass flight”
of slaves from Rapides and Avoyelles Parishes, Louisiana, to Mexico,
303
but Cheney himself revealed the plot to his owner “to curry favor.”
More extreme than mere information disclosure, some slaves went so
304
For example,
far as to assist slaveholders in capturing runaways.
George and Jim, two slaves, were accused of killing Isaac, another
305
slave.
Their alleged motive for the killing was that Isaac “had
combined with the white folks to betray George to the sheriff, and it was
306
thought he was also engaged to apprehend Jim.”
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296. See id. at 330 n.17 (citing ULRICH BONNELL PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO
SLAVERY: A SURVEY OF THE SUPPLY, EMPLOYMENT AND CONTROL OF NEGRO LABOR AS
DETERMINED BY THE PLANTATION RÉGIME 486 (1918)).
297. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 343.
298. Id. at 343.
299. Id. at 343–44.
300. See id. at 343–44.
301. Id. at 351.
302. See discussion supra notes 229–35 and accompanying text.
303. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 334 & n.33 (quoting NORTHUP, supra note 111, at
189). Cheney survived Whites’ mass executions and was rewarded. NORTHUP, supra note
111, at 189 & n.2. “[H]is name is despised and execrated by all his race throughout the
parishes of Rapides and Avoyelles.” Id. at 189.
304. JONES, supra note 41, at 168.
305. Jim v. State, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 145, 145 (1844).
306. Id. at 151.
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VI. A BRIEF DEFENSE OF DOMESTIC SLAVES
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307. See JONES, supra note 41, at 113.
308. See APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 61–63.
309. See, e.g., Steven Zeitchik, The Contenders: Slavery, Comedy and Guns, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 2012, at S24 (describing Samuel L. Jackson’s character in Django Unchained, a
domestic slave who snitches, as “one of the most despised Negroes in cinematic history”).
310. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 61.
311. See id. at 62.
312. See id. at 62–63.
313. See id. at 62, 328 (citing BIBB, supra note 228, at 136).
314. See APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 328.
315. See id. at 329 (quoting Letter to a Member of Congress, Dated December 29, 1835,
from New Orleans, 49 NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER 331 (1836)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
316. See discussion supra Part V.
317. SCOT FRENCH, THE REBELLIOUS SLAVE: NAT TURNER IN AMERICAN MEMORY
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Slaves who worked in the owner’s household or performed in
307
During slavery, house
domestic roles were known as house slaves.
slaves were known or reputed to have been willing to do the bidding of
308
White owners, including informing, to the detriment of other slaves.
Today, house slaves are still vilified in the Black community and being
309
called a house slave is a serious insult.
Quite possibly, house slaves
may be the subject of unfair criticism.
Historian Herbert Aptheker opined that spies and traitors primarily
310
came from the domestic class. He contended that owners encouraged
311
domestics to maintain distance from field workers.
Presumably, the
lack of connection to other slaves promoted owner loyalty over
allegiance to other slaves, and thus a willingness to protect a master’s
312
interests.
Aptheker’s position finds support in both the reporting of
313
unsuccessful slave rebellions and first-person slave accounts.
Some house slaves did reveal rebellion plots beforehand, allowing
the plans to be quashed before getting underway. In South Carolina
and Georgia in October 1835, “[a]n old domestic slave revealed . . . a
314
plan for rebellion.” In East Feliciana, Louisiana in December 1835, a
“confidential servant” revealed a “serious” plot by two Whites and “a
great many of the most favorite confidential servants,” making “it all the
315
more disturbing.”
Denmark Vesey’s plot on Charleston, South
316
Carolina, was undone in whole or part by a house slave.
Beck, a
young slave girl who considered herself a house slave, testified against
alleged members of Nat Turner’s rebellion in Virginia, although she did
317
not betray the rebellion beforehand.

34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 60 Side A

03/17/2014 11:30:34

DENNIS-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/15/2014 4:38 PM

A SNITCH IN TIME

325

Likewise, some house slaves betrayed runaway slaves. Harriet
Jacobs, who was secreted from her master in the house of her
318
grandmother, was twice almost betrayed by a domestic servant.
In stepped Jenny, the mischievous housemaid, who had tried to
enter my room, when I was concealed in the house of my white
benefactress. . . . I had slunk down behind a barrel, which
entirely screened me, but I imagined that Jenny was looking
directly at the spot . . . .
Uncle Phillip was sent for, and he agreed with his mother in
thinking that Jenny would inform Dr. Flint in less than twenty319
four hours.
....
Of course, the day was an anxious one for us all. But we
concluded that if Jenny had seen me, she would be too wise to let
her mistress know of it; and that she probably would not get a
chance to see Dr. Flint’s family till evening, for I knew very well
what were the rules in that household. I afterwards believe that
she did not see me; for nothing ever came of it, and she was one
of those base characters that would have jumped to betray a
320
suffering fellow being for the sake of thirty pieces of silver.
Henry Bibb after escaping to freedom and writing his story claimed:

Similarly, ex-slave Austin Steward offered much criticism regarding
322
house slaves. He claimed:
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37–40 (2004). Beck was a young slave girl, approximately twelve to fifteen years of age. Id. at
38. She considered herself a house slave and spent the vast majority of her time with her
mistress, rather than other slaves. Id. Thus, she may have been motivated to testify against
the slaves by loyalty to her master and mistress. See id. at 37–38. Beck’s testimony was
heavily challenged for its lack of credibility. Id. at 40–41, 61–63.
318. JACOBS, supra note 77, at 216, 254–56.
319. Id. at 254.
320. Id. at 255–56.
321. BIBB, supra note 228, at 136.
322. See LESTER, supra note 111, at 90–91 (citing CHARLES H. NICHOLS, MANY
THOUSAND GONE: THE EX-SLAVES’ ACCOUNT OF THEIR BONDAGE AND FREEDOM 74–75
(1963)) (revealing the beliefs of slave Austin Steward).
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[T]he domestic slaves are often found to be traitors to their own
people, for the purpose of gaining favor with their masters; and
they are encouraged and trained up by them to report every plot
they know of being formed about stealing [anything], or running
321
away, or [anything] of the kind; and for which they are paid.
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[M]any of them are the most despicable tale-bearers and
mischief-makers, who will, for the sake of the favor of his master
or mistress, frequently betray his fellow slave, and by tattling, get
him severely whipped; and for these acts . . . he is often rewarded
by his master, who knows it is for his interest to keep such ones
about him; though he is sometimes obliged, in addition to a
reward, to send him away, for fear of the vengeance of the
323
betrayed slaves.
The quotes from Bibb and Steward indicate that they, and likely
other slaves, believed Whites purposely cultivated informant behavior
among domestic slaves, owners rewarded betrayals by house slaves, and
owners believed what their trusted servants told them. A domestic slave
confirmed their beliefs:
They taught us [domestics] to be against one another and no
matter where you would go you would always find one that
would be tattling and would have the white folks pecking on you.
324
They would be trying to make it soft for themselves.
On the other hand, Historian Norrece T. Jones has observed that
concluding domestic slaves would “betray a fellow slave for little more
325
than a hand-me-down garment or a flattering remark” is overblown.
The story of William Hayden, a domestic slave, supports Jones’
326
327
proposition. Hayden acknowledged informing on his brethren. His
motivation, though, was more significant than the mere receipt of prized
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323. AUSTIN STEWARD, TWENTY-TWO YEARS A SLAVE, AND FORTY YEARS A
FREEMAN; EMBRACING A CORRESPONDENCE OF SEVERAL YEARS, WHILE PRESIDENT OF
WILBERFORCE COLONY, LONDON, CANADA WEST 32 (Rochester, William Alling 1857)
(detailing the beliefs of slave Austin Steward). For an alternative version of the quote, see
APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 62–63 (“[A] domestic slave will for the sake of his master and
mistress, frequently betray his fellow-slave . . . he is often rewarded by his master who knows
it is for his interest to keep such ones about him . . . hence it is that insurrections and
stampedes are so generally detected. Such slaves are always treated with more affability than
others, for the slaveholder is well aware that he stands over a volcano.”).
324. Unwritten History, in THE BOOK OF NEGRO FOLKLORE 45, 47 (Langston Hughes
& Arna Bontemps eds., 1958); see also LESTER, supra note 111, at 90 (quoting Unwritten
History, supra).
325. JONES, supra note 41, at 114, 118.
326. WILLIAM HAYDEN, NARRATIVE OF WILLIAM HAYDEN, CONTAINING A
FAITHFUL ACCOUNT OF HIS TRAVELS FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, WHILST A SLAVE, IN THE
SOUTH 77–78 (photo. reprint 1969) (1846); LESTER, supra note 111, at 91 (citing NICHOLS,
supra note 322, at 85).
327. HAYDEN, supra note 326, at 77–78.
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clothing or owner favor: the rebellious slaves on whom he informed
328
planned to kill him along with all present Whites.
Sleeping in a room adjacent to the slaves, who were ironed, I
discerned enough from their conversation to enable me to know
that a mutiny was abroad, and that it was the intention of the
slaves, in order to effect their freedom, to put to death all the
whites on board,—and that I, too, was included,—owing to the
attention that was paid me,—with the doomed. By jests and
cheerfulness with them, however, I gathered from their detached
hints, their every movement. That they had even then provided
themselves with a file from the lot of Blacksmith tools on board,
and that many were at that moment, free from their chains. This
information I immediately carried to my master; and after
ascertaining the truth of my statement, he had them again bound
329
more firmly than ever.
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328. Id.
329. Id. (relaying the account of slave William Hayden).
330. See discussion supra Part III.D.
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Notwithstanding the firsthand accounts of slaves, without more data,
arguably it is either speculative or erroneous to conclude that most
Black informants were domestic slaves or that overwhelmingly domestic
slaves were informants. Undoubtedly, domestic slaves may have had
special or greater incentives to inform than other slaves (e.g., owner
loyalty, preservation of status). They might have also had more
opportunity and faced great pressure to betray their fellow slaves
because of proximity to owners who sought to use them as informants.
As a class, however, it is unclear that they were actually more likely
to inform or more likely to be informants than other Blacks. All
slaves—including domestics—had to be cognizant of the repercussions
330
from other slaves if they informed.
At a minimum, they faced
ostracism and at worst, death, and their master may have been unwilling
or unable to protect them from either. Further, at some point all slaves
probably needed the benefit of a slave code of silence for much conduct
could be deemed misconduct by owners. And while some domestic
slaves might have had few close relations with other slaves, others
probably had relationships worth prioritizing. Thus, many domestics
who could have informed on another slave would have had strong
incentive not to do so.
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VII. THE NEGATIVE INFLUENCES OF INFORMANTS

See discussion supra Part III.
See DOUGLASS, supra note 19, at 98.
See JONES, supra note 41, at 182, 191.
Id. at 191 (citing HIGGINSON, supra note 258, at 248).
See supra Part V.
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By now it is clear that Whites undertook efforts to promote
informing by Blacks, and that some Blacks did in fact inform while
others refused to do so. However, ascertaining the extent of informing
and refusals and other discerning elements such as who might be more
or less likely to inform and under what circumstances is nearly
impossible. What can also be preliminarily gleaned from the data,
although more nuanced definitive conclusions cannot be drawn, is that
White efforts to promote informing and Black informants themselves
contributed to division and distrust within, and inaction by, the Black
community during slavery.
Some slaves distrusted their brethren due to their knowledge or
suspicion. Whites intentionally sought to divide slaves and develop a
cadre of informants by, among other means, favoring some slaves over
others, rewarding the provision of information, and using Black
331
religious leaders to detect slave misconduct.
By way of example,
escaped slave Frederick Douglass emphatically proclaimed: “The motto
which I adopted when I started from slavery was this—‘Trust no man!’ I
saw in every white man an enemy, and in almost every colored man
332
cause for distrust.”
Douglass probably was not alone in his
perspective, although he may have been the most public voice on the
topic.
If slaves distrusted each other, then Professor Norrece Jones’ claim
that the potential for betrayals did more to deter rebellions than the lack
333
of weapons, information, or organization is not surprising. According
to Jones, as far as slaves were concerned, and as far as appeared true,
334
rebellions were always betrayed beforehand. The many infamous and
less well-known rebellions that were squelched due to Black informants
335
support this contention.
Consequently, it is understandable if many
slaves completely avoided rebellious efforts because they reasonably
expected their efforts to be unsuccessful.
Even for those slaves willing to contemplate organized resistance,
the few rebellions that were successful, in whole or part, reveal how
difficult it was to keep a rebellion-in-waiting from being betrayed and
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forestalled. Such difficulty could serve as a strong disincentive to act.
The Nat Turner Rebellion in 1831 Southampton, Virginia, is the most
336
well-known, successful slave-led rebellion.
Ultimately, Turner was
captured alive, and before his execution, he recounted the events to
337
Thomas Gray, who officially recorded Turner’s confession. Assuming
the credibility of Turner’s confession to Gray, Turner’s version of events
reveals the great lengths he went to in order to keep his plans secret and
how luck was sometimes necessary to avoid other slaves preemptively
338
revealing information to Whites.
Turner believed God had commanded him to rebel and that he was
339
to not tell anyone until he received a sign. When he received the sign,
he told “four in whom [he] had the greatest confidence, (Henry, Hark,
340
Nelson, and Sam).” They worked together to come up with plans but
341
Turner then received another sign that told him
rejected them all.
342
they could wait no longer. So, the group agreed on August 20, 1831, to
343
meet the next evening over dinner to finalize a plan. When the five
344
Turner provided no
met, they were joined by Will and Jack.
explanation as to how Will and Jack came to be invited, except that Jack
345
“was only a tool in the hands of Hark.” They all agreed to start the
insurrection that night—Sunday—at the house of Turner’s master and in
346
347
Their killing spree began and spread.
Other slaves
fact did so.
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336. Jennifer L. Larson, A Rebellion to Remember: The Legacy of Nat Turner,
DOCUMENTING THE AMERICAN SOUTH, http://docsouth.unc.edu/highlights/turner.html (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013); U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Slave Rebellions, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
http://www.nps.gov/subjects/ugrr/discover_history/slave-rebellions.htm (last updated Sept. 6,
2011).
337. NAT TURNER & THOMAS R. GRAY, THE CONFESSIONS OF NAT TURNER, THE
LEADER OF THE LATE INSURRECTION IN SOUTHAMPTON, VA. AS FULLY AND
VOLUNTARILY MADE TO THOMAS R. GRAY 3–4 (Richmond, Thomas R. Gray 1832).
338. Id. at 10–11. Gray’s credibility in recording Turner’s confession is debated. See
Brophy, supra note 156, at 1860 n.300 (identifying various positions regarding the credibility
of Gray’s taking of Turner’s confession).
339. TURNER & GRAY, supra note 337, at 9–10.
340. Id. at 10.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. (describing the meeting and preparation on the night of August 20th); Larson,
supra note 336 (stating that the rebellion began on August 21, 1831).
345. TURNER & GRAY, supra note 337, at 10–11.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 11–14.
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Id. at 14–15.
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Id. at 10–11.
See id. at 11–12.
Id. at 14–15.
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joined as they went along; the group numbered fifteen men, then about
348
forty, then fifty or sixty members.
Eventually the group encountered White resistance that forced the
349
group to separate.
Turner sent two men (Jacob and Nat) to find
Henry, Sam, Nelson, and Hark and tell them to meet him where they
350
By Wednesday, when no one had
had dinner the Sunday before.
joined him and he saw White men riding around looking like they were
searching for someone, Turner “concluded Jacob and Nat had been
351
taken, and compelled to betray” him.
He hid in the woods for six
weeks and was only discovered due to a dog that came across his cave
352
where Turner had a piece of meat. When the dog passed by the cave
again, this time accompanied by two slaves, the dog alerted to the
353
cave.
Turner thought he was discovered and so made himself
354
known. The two slaves ran off and Turner knew “they would betray”
355
So he left that hiding place and was free for two more weeks
him.
356
before being discovered.
A number of factors arguably explain the relative success of Turner
and his band. First, Turner did not initially reveal his intentions to
anyone, and when eventually he did, he only did so to a close-knit, small
357
group who kept his silence. Second, the group was successful for quite
some time because it endeavored to kill every White person it came
across and because other slaves did not seem to be running to warn
White folks, either because they had joined the rebellion or feared the
358
rebels. Thus, it took some time for the White community to be put on
notice and gather itself to respond. Even then, though, the response did
359
Finally, Turner’s
not come because any slave betrayed the group.
success might have been primarily based on luck. While Turner and his
co-conspirators were tight-lipped about their plan, there does not
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appear to have been a strong effort to maintain silence, which stands in
stark contrast to the controlled, large-scale planning effort of Denmark
360
Vesey and his second-in-command.
Vesey and his group of
accomplices took great pains to control information flow to prevent a
361
betrayal; yet, betrayed they were. Turner, contrastingly, did not take
such significant measures, and happenstance was likely the reason he
362
was not betrayed beforehand.
VIII. CONCLUSION

C M
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360. See discussion supra Part VI.
361. See BENNETT, supra note 81, at 129–31.
362. Compare id., with TURNER & GRAY, supra note 337, at 10. Though Turner’s
planned rebellion was not revealed before it began, it is worth noting that slaves did testify
against other slaves charged with crimes. See, e.g., Brophy, supra note 156, at 1825 & n.45,
1850, 1879. For example, a participant named Moses and an uninvolved house slave named
Beck both testified. See FRENCH, supra note 317, at 37–41, 61–63 (discussing Beck’s
testimony); Brophy, supra note 156, at 1825 n.45 (describing Moses’ role). He may have been
motivated by criminal leniency and she by loyalty to her mistress. See FRENCH, supra note
317, at 37–41, 61–63; Brophy, supra note 156, at 1825 n.45.
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With limited exception, scholars of any discipline have yet to
robustly explore Blacks’ experience with informing, much less during
slavery. Documenting and studying the socio-legal historical experience
of Black Americans with informing affords scholars the opportunity to
consider what these past findings may mean for the present. This
Article offers the beginnings of an historical description, drawing on a
number of sources to broadly describe the experience of Black slaves,
and occasionally free Blacks, as informants. Undoubtedly, as this is not
an exhaustive account, there is more historical work to be done.
Continuing generally to search for information wherever it may be
found and wherever it leads might be one approach. Alternatively,
research might focus specifically. For instance, in-depth examination on
informing in particular Southern colonies or states or during particular
time periods would be fruitful. Work might closely examine the use of
informants for particular types of misconduct. Finally, an interesting
comparison would be that of slave informants in the South as compared
to the North, or on plantations in contrast to more urban or populated
areas.
How might the information herein inform our thinking today?
Admittedly, there are patently significant differences between the Black
community’s position today and during slave times that may undermine
analysis of the present implications of history today. The most apparent
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363. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 3, at 12, 14 (discussing former law enforcement
officers’ recognition of the necessity of informants); Natapoff, Communal Consequences,
supra note 2, at 652, 660–61; Hampson, supra note 3 (quoting Pittsburgh police commander:
“Informers are a necessary evil”); see also supra Part II.A; see, e.g., supra Part III.K.
364. See supra Part II.A.
365. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 3, 35.
366. See BLOOM, supra note 24, at 6–7.
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distinction is that Blacks are no longer enslaved and so are not focused
on the fundamental recognition of their individual and collective
humanity. Rather, they benefit from significantly more social and legal
protections than during slavery, even if still marginalized. Additionally,
informing on fellow slave subjects poses greater moral dilemma than
informing on neighbors who prey on the community. Indeed, during
slavery, informing on seriously troublesome Blacks was sanctioned.
Notwithstanding the distinctions, the historical snapshot developed
herein reveals many similarities between the Black experience with
informing then and today. For example, societal justification for
informants then and now—necessity—remains the same, and
government-offered incentives to inform existed during slavery and
363
continue at present.
Moreover, individual and communal response
among Blacks was ambivalent in both eras. Finally, the negative
impacts of informants on the Black community then and today remain
quite similar.
These resemblances lend support to referencing Black historical
experience when considering modern informant law and policy. A few
suggestions follow. First, we could recognize that a formal criminal
justice system less reliant on informants is not unprecedented. During
slavery, the government endorsement of informants in the Black
community was limited to the most necessary of circumstances that
364
benefited (White) society. In contrast, the use of informants today is
widespread, reaching all manner of conduct and having widespread
365
collateral impacts.
This expansion of the government’s reliance on
informants might be partially explainable by the move away from
private prosecution and the growth in the number of crimes since
366
slavery, but the narrow use of informants during slavery at least
presents one model for government.
Second, rather than demonizing members of the Black community
for holding an anti-cooperative ethic, we might understand that Black
contestation is legitimately rooted and not abnormal. As during slavery,
Black folks today, individually and on a communal level, do not speak
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367. See BUTLER, supra note 6, at 79–100 (summarizing the debate surrounding
informing); WILLIAMS, supra note 14 at 111–18 (decrying the growth of the Stop Snitching
movement for its increase in Black crime).
368. See Natapoff, Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 683–85.
369. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 69, 126–28; Natapoff,
Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 663–64.
370. Natapoff, Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 690–92.
371. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 129–30; Natapoff,
Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 689–90.

34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 64 Side A

with one voice on the topic. Viewpoints on snitching and informing are
highly contested and deeply entrenched. On one hand, some argue that
informing and government promotion of informing is necessary to
prevent and solve crime, particularly Black-on-Black crime; and that the
367
penalties for not informing make the decision to inform appropriate.
On the other hand, it is argued that informing leads to unnecessary and
368
disproportionate incarceration of Blacks, particularly Black men;
invites and contributes to government abuses, such as police brutality
369
and unreliable convictions; fractionates the Black community by
pitting community members, friends, and family members against each
370
other; and exposes Blacks to retaliation that the government is
unwilling or unable to prevent, thus making the stakes too high for the
371
It is apparent, then, that the slave
individual and community.
perspective and modern Black viewpoint are quite similar if not
identical. The community ambivalence is old and longstanding.
What might explain this longstanding schizophrenia? Laws and the
experience of law influence social behaviors and perspectives. Norms
are transmitted from generation to generation. History tells us that
American society has long been quite willing to police and foment
disunity in the Black community by actively promoting informing.
Consequently, rebutting Black folks’ entrenched conceptions regarding
informing may prove more difficult than expected. Understanding
history helps to depolarize the debate surrounding informants and
allows for meaningful, honest conversation on whether the Black
community as a whole should endorse informing; whether Blacks should
engage in the practice; and how the government should respond to the
Black perspective—whether well-founded or not.
Relatedly, a final potential application of the history revealed herein
is to the development of responses to the Stop Snitching motto and
broad-based code of silence adhered to by some in the Black
community.
Government responses have been varied, including
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increased protection of witnesses and the enactment of public relations
campaigns that encourage the reporting of crime and cooperation with
372
police.
Yet none of these solutions adequately account for the
potential legitimacy of anti-cooperation and robust social and moral
ambivalence Blacks hold toward informing. Government officials
recognize that deep mistrust of law enforcement discourages
373
informing.
Nonetheless, the solutions tend toward a utilitarian costbenefit rationale, emphasizing decreased penalties for informants,
physical safety of informants, and community benefit. Understanding
the complexity of viewpoints and genuinely reflecting such in solutiongenerating, however, might generate different responses.
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372. See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 10, at 31–33, 38–39
(describing the creation of an anonymous tip program in Washington, D.C. and the “Keep
Talking” campaign instituted by the Baltimore Police Department in response to Stop
Snitching).
373. See id.

